UC-NRLF 


$B    313    Ebl 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/attackdefenseoffOOhyderich 


i 

4 


o 

< 

s 

< 
o 

H 

P5 
< 

pq 

;?: 
o 

O 
w 

o 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE 


OF 


FORTIFIED  HARBORS 


BY 
CAPTAIN  ARTHUR  P.  S.  HYDE 

Coast  Artillery  Corps,  Lfnited  States  Army 
Inspector-Instructor  of  Coast  Artillery  Militia, 
National  Guard  of  Washington 


Second  Edition 


FRANKLIN  HUDSON  PUBLISHING  CO., 
Kansas  City,  Missouri,  U,  S.  A. 


Copyright  1916 

By  Franklin  Hudson  Publishing  Company 

Kaosas  City,  Mo. 


Coast  Defenses  of  Puget  Sound. 

355534 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Chapter     I. — General  Principles  of  Coast  Defense,  13 

Chapter    II. — Naval  Attack,       .        .        .        .        .  24 

Chapter  III. — Defense  Against  Naval  Attack, .  ^^ 

Chapter  IV. — Combined  Land  and  Naval  Attack,  .  46 

Chapter    V. — Defense  Against  Combined  Land  and 

Naval  Attack,        ....  56 

Appendix  A — Questions  for  a  Correspondence 

Course,  based  upon  this  Book,       .  67 

Appendix  B — Bibliography,        .         .         .         .  73 

Appendix  C — Series  of  Book  Reviews  of  First 

Edition, 75 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


A  1 2 -inch  Gun  on  Barbette  Carriage,   .       .    Frontispiece, 

Loading  a  lo-inch  Gun  on  Disappearing  Carriage,  14 

A  6-inch  Gun  on  Disappearing  Carriage,  firing  with 

Sub-caliber  Ammunition 30 

A  Battery  of  3-inch  Rapid  Fire  Guns,      ...  34 

A  Mortar  Pit, 42 

The  Explosion  of  a  Submarine  Mine,       .        .        .  46 

A  Group  of  Fire-control  Stations,         ....  62 

Map. 

Coast  Defenses  of  Puget  Sound, 3 


PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  subject-matter  contained  in  the  following  pages 
was  published  originally  as  a  series  of  articles  appearing 
in  the  Seattle  Daily  Times  in  January  and  February,  1914, 
prepared  at  the  requjest  of  the  managing  editor  of  the 
Times.  The  interest  displayed  in  these  articles  by  officers 
of  the  Coast  Artillery  Reserve  Corps,  together  with  a  de- 
sire on  their  part  to  make  a  careful  study  of  the  important 
subject  of  the  attack  and  defense  of  fortified  harbors,  has 
led  to  a  revision  of  the  material  and  its  publication  in  its 
present  form. 

I  desire  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  Major 
Howard  A.  Hanson,  C.  A.  C,  N.  G.  W.,  for  much  valuable 
assistance  rendered  in  the  revision  of  these  papers,  and  to 
Captain  C.  B.  Blethen,  C.  A.  C,  N.  G.  W.,  for  many 
courtesies  in  connectiom  with  the  publication  of  this  book. 

Arthur  P.  S.  Uybh.  ' 
The  Adjutant'GeneraV s  Office, 

S^ATTi^E,  Wash.,  October  5,  1914. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


A  desire  to  put  the  subject-matter  of  this  work  in  a 
more  readable  form  than  the  first  edition,  which  was 
printed  from  newspaper  type  and  issued  as  a  pamphlet, 
has  led  to  a  general  revision  of  the  entire  book. 

Events  of  the  great  European  war  have  transpired 
since  the  earlier  edition,  involving  the  attack  upon  coast 
fortifications  and  their  defense.  Although  the  informa- 
tion thus  far  available  concerning  these  operations  is  very 
meager,  yet  enough  has  been  made  public  to  emphasize 
some  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  attack  and  de- 
fense of  fortified  harbors  enunciated  in  the  following  pages. 

In  presenting  this  edition  to  the  public,  I  desire  to 
express  my  appreciation  to  Captain  Clarance  B.  Blethen, 
Field  Artillery,  N.  G.  W.,  for  the  originals  of  the  illustra- 
tions with  which  the  book  is  embellished,  taken  from  the 
files  of  the  Seattle  Daily  and  Sunday  Times,  to  which  free 
access  was  accorded  me. 

Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde. 
The  Adjutant-GeneraV  s  Office, 

Seatti,^,  Wash.,  December  i,  1915. 


STATE  OF  WASHINGTON 
MILITARY  DEPARTMENT 


Office  of  the  Inspector-Instructobs 
612  Haight  Building 


Seattle,  January  21,  1916. 

From:  Captain  Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde,  C.  A.  C. 

To:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 

(Through  The  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs.) 


Subject:    Approval  of    revised    edition  of  "Attack  and  Defense  of 
Fortified  Harbors."  . 


1.  I  have  recently  revised  the  book  entitled  "Attack  and  De- 
fense of  Fortified  Harbors/'  written  by  me,  and  have  had  it  accept- 
ed for  publication  by  the  Franklin  Hudson  PubUshing  Company,  of 
Kansas  City,  Missouri. 

2.  Since  the  work  was  completed  and  has  been  in  the  hands  of 
the  printer,  it  has  been  suggested  to  me  that,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  certain  incidents  in  connection  with  the  European  War  are 
mentioned  as  illustrating  principles  enunciated,  the  provisions  of 
G.  O.  No.  10,  War  Department,  1915,  might  apply.  Personally  I 
do  not  think  the  statements  made  come  within  the  restrictions'  im- 
posed in  that  order,  but  in  order  to  assure  myself  of  the  approval  of 
the  War  Department,  I  am  transmitting  herewith  complete  proof- 
sheets  of  the  book  together  with  illustrations,  with  the  request  that 
the  Department  pass  definitely  upon  the  book  and  indicate  what,  if 
any,  passages  should  be  omitted. 

10  Inclosures.  Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde. 


1st  Indt.  O  62.13 

War  Department.  Divn.  Militia  Affairs,  O.  C.  S.,  February  2,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General. 

1.  The  proof  of  Captain  A.  P.  S.  Hj-de's  ''Attack  and  Defense 
of  Fortified  Harbors"  has  been  read  in  this  office.  The  proposed 
book  is  purely  technical  in  nature  and  it  is  not  believed  that  General 
Orders,  No.  10,  War  Department,  1915,  was  intended  to  apply  in 
such  cases. 

2.  It  is  recommended  that  Captain  Hyde  be  informed  that  there 
is  no  objection  to  the  publication  of  his  work. 

A.  L.  Mills, 
10  Inclosures.  Brig.  Gen.,  G.  8.,  Chief  of  Divn. 

Approved  as  recommended  in  1st  Indt. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

Tasker  H.  Bliss, 
Major  General,  Chief  Mobile  Army  Div. 
For  Chief  cf  Staff. 


2366096  2nd  Indt. 

War  Dept.,  A.  G.  O.,  Feb.  5,  1916.  —  To  The  Chief,  Division  of 
Militia  Affairs,  inviting  attention  to  the  approval  of  the  Secretary' 
of  War  indorsed  on  this  page. 

W.  M.  Wright, 
10  Inclosures.  Adjutant  General. 


3rd  Indt.  0  62.13 

War  Dept.,  Divn.  Militia  Affairs,  O.  C.  S.,  Feb.  1,  1916. 
To  The  Adjutant  General.     Noted. 
10  Inclosures. 


2366096  4th  Indt. 

War  Dept.,  A.  G.  O.,  Feb.  9,  1916.  — To  Capt.  Arthur  P.  S. 
Hyde,  Coast  Artillery  Corps,  Inspector- Instructor,  care  Adjutant 
General,  State  of  Washington,  Olympia,  Wash.,  inviting  attention 
to  the  preceding  indorsements  hereon,  and  to  the  approval  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  indorsed  on  page  2. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War: 

W.  M.  Wright, 
10  Inclosures.  Adjutant^General. 


Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors. 


CHAPTER  I. 


G^N^RAI,  PRINCIPI.HS  OF  CoAST  D^F^NS^. 


Permanent  Works. 

Permanent  fortifications  exist  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
fending the  frontier  of  a  State  against  invasion  on  the 
part  of  the  armed  forces  of  other  States.  These  fortifi- 
cations are  divided  into  two  general  classes — depending 
upon  their  location — known  as  land  defenses  and  coast 
defenses. 

On  the  Continent  of  Europe,  where  States  differing 
materially  in  nationality,  race,  and  institutions  border 
upon  one  another,  all  maintaining  large  standing  armies, 
it  is  very  necessary  that  the  lines,  often  imaginary,  which 
separate  them  should  be  thoroughly  defended  by  per- 
manent works.  England,  on  the  other  hand,  being  an 
island  kingdom,  has  no  land  frontiers,  and  her  first  line  of 
defense  is  therefore  her  seacoast. 

In  our  country  the  conditions  differ  from  both  the 
Continent  of  Europe  and  Great  Britain.  While  we  have 
land  frontiers  to  the  north  and  south  of  us,  the  bordering 
countries  do  not  maintain  great  standing  armies,  and  it  is 
hardly  to  be  expected  that  our  territory  would  be  subject 
to  invasion  from  either  direction.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
our  treaty  relations  with  Canada  forbid  the  maintain- 

13 


14       ATTACK  AND   D^I^^NS^   OF  FORTlFlJSD   HARBORS. 

ing  ol  Armament  upon  the  Great  Lakes  and,  by  inference, 
along  the  land  frontier.  It  may  therefore  be  said  that  the 
only  direction  we  may  reasonably  look  for  a  possible  inva- 
sion in  time  of  war  is  from  across  the  seas.  Thus  it  would 
appear  that  the  only  frontier  which  must  be  defended  by 
permanent  fortifications  is  our  coast  line. 

Continuous  Coast  Defenses  Impracticabi.e;. 

The  question  therefore  is,  How  can  adequate  defense 
be  attained?  It  is  manifestly  impossible  to  establish  a 
continuous  line  of  fortifications,  so  the  important  harbors, 
commercially  or  strategically,  or  both,  have  been  selected 
to  be  fortified. 

Our  permanent  system  of  coast  defense  is  the  re- 
sult of  careful  study  by  a  coast  defense  board,  known  as 
the  Endicott  Board,  appointed  during  the  first  adminis- 
tration of  President  Grover  Cleveland,  and  which  took 
its  name  from  Secretary  of  War  William  C.  Endicott,  its 
president.  This  board  visited  all  important  points  on 
oiu*  seacoasts  from  Eastport  to  Brownsville  and  from 
Blaine  to  San  Diego,  and  as  the  result  of  careful  study  of 
the  situation,  recommended  the  harbors  which  should  be 
provided  with  permanent  fortifications  and  the  character 
of  the  armament  to  be  installed  in  each. 

Although  this  board  met  nearly  thirty  years  ago,  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  the  system  outlined  by  it  has 
been  followed  nearly  to  the  letter.  A  few  changes  have 
been  made — such,  for  example,  as  the  establishment  of  a 
chain  of  forts  on  the  islands  across  the  entrance  to  Long 
Island  Sound,  instead  of  fortifying  the  harbors  of  the 
Sound  cities  of  New  London  and  New  Haven,  and  the 
elimination  of  all  floating  batteries. 


1  ii^==yrrll 

k 

^^^9'^  ---^ 

^^^^^hF^v^  1 

■Hw^  f i "  \  '^ 

'  ^^p 

SB  ^ 

■try<^'! 

L^^^l 

^1 

'"""^^^iT  l^BB^ 

y^ 

^^^^ 

M 

,  _^_E-— -^^  ^&1kL3s 

s-i^ 

Ih^v    'SIL^ 

klEJ 

pB  ^j3^ 

^iE? 

^i  M 

^H   '     il^C'    -'li^; 

rfi' 

^m                .HMM 

jIV'  I:     ^ 

'iT'^^K^I 

Eh^^ 

o 

O 

o 

S 
w 

< 


o 


o 

S 
<; 
o 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.        1 5 

A  few  years  ago  a  similar  body,  known  as  the  Taft 
Board  (headed  by  Secretary  of  War  WilHam  H.  Taft), 
again  studied  the  situation,  and  recommended  some  sHght 
revisions.  The  defensive  scheme,  as  outHned  by  the 
first  and  modified  by  the  s6Cond  board,  has  been  prac- 
tically completed,  with  the  exception  of  the  fortifications 
at  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay  and  at  San  Pedro  (the 
port  of  Los  Angeles). 

In  addition,  our  territorial  expansion  which  resulted 
from  the  Spanish  War  and  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal  have  made  necessary  the  erection  of  permanent 
works  of  the  strongest  character  for  the  dejFense  of  Manila 
and  Subic  Bays  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  Honolulu  and 
the  great  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbor  in  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  the  Canal  Zone,  and  the  naval  station  at  Guan- 
tanamo,  Cuba.  The  construction  of  these  works  has 
been  pushed  with  vigor  and  they  are  to-day  nearly 
completed. 

Fortified  Harbors. 

The  harbors  selected  for  permanent  coast  defenses 
within  the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States  are 
as  follows: 

On  the  Atlantic  Coast :  the  mouth  of  the  Kennebec 
River,  Portland,  Portsmouth,  Boston,  New  Bedford,  Nar- 
ragansett  Bay,  the  eastern  entrance  to  Long  Island  Sound, 
New  York,  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware  River,  Baltimore, 
the  Potomac  River,  Hampton  Roads,  the  mouth  of  the 
Cape  Fear  River,  Charleston,  Port  Royal,  Savannah,  and 
Key  West.  Of  these,  the  defenses  of  Baltimore,  the  Po- 
tomac River,  and  Hampton  Roads  will  be  rendered  of 
secondary  importance  upon  the  completion  of  the  fortifica* 
tions  at  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay.     The  defenses 


1 6       ATTACK  AND   DKI^^^NS^   O^  I^ORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

of  Port  Royal  were  erected  for  the  protection  of  the  naval 
station  at  that  place.  Since  the  virtual  abandonment  of 
this  station  by  the  Navy  Department,  the  coast  artillery 
garrison  has  been  withdrawn  and  the  importance  of  the 
defenses  greatly  decreased.  While  forts  and  batteries 
have  been  built  and  guns  emplaced  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Kennebec  River,  no  garrisons  have  ever  been  provided. 

On  the  Gulf  Coast  the  fortified  ports  are:  Tampa, 
Pensacola,  Mobile,  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
and  Galveston. 

On  the  Pacific  Coast  they  are:  Puget  Sound,  the 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  River,  San  Francisco,  Los  Angeles 
(San  Pedro),  and  San  Diego. 

Location  of  Coast  Fortifications. 

Having  selected  the  harbors  to  be  defended,  the  next 
question  to  arise  is,  How  shall  the  defenses  be  located? 
On  this  point  there  has  been  quite  a  change  of  thought  in 
recent  years,  so  that  many  of  the  defenses  constructed 
more  than  ten  years  ago  are  not  disposed  in  accordance 
with  the  latest  and  best  strategical  and  tactical  ideas. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be 
found  in  a  consideration  of  the  problem  of  how  best  to 
meet  the  possible  forms  of  attack  that  may  be  brought 
against  the  defenses. 

CI.ASSES  OF  Attack. 

Coast  defenses  are  subject  to  three  general  classes  of 
attack — viz.,  from  the  sea,  from  the  land,  and  from  the 
air;  and  of  course  it  necessarily  follows  that  any  two  or 
more  of  these  forms  may  be  combined.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  latter  undoubtedly  would  be  the  situation  in  the 
event  of  a  determined  attack  on  our  coast  defenses.     Un- 


ATTACK  AND   DBF^KNS^    OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        1 7 

fortunately,  little  or  nothing  has  been  done  in  the  way  of 
providing  land  defenses  for  our  forts.  We  are  exception- 
ally well  defensed,  in  so  far  as  the  sea  fronts  are  con- 
cerned— so  well,  in  fact,  that  we  may  safely  say  it  would 
be  impossible  for  our  forts  either  to  be  reduced  by  bom- 
bardment by  a  hostile  fleet  or  rendered  untenable,  due  to 
attack  by  sea  alone. 

Bombardment. 
There  are  several  forms  of  operations  that  are  open 
to  an  attacking  fleet.  For  example,  vessels  may  lie  at 
nearly  extreme  range  and  bombard  the  forts,  with  a  view 
to  disabling  guns  and  fire-control  stations  and  to  produce 
such  demoralization  among  the  personnel  as  may  be  pos- 
sible. This  method  never  promises  decisive  results,  as 
was  amply  demonstrated  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
Dardanelles  campaign. 

'*Run  Pastr 

Again,  the  fleet  may  attempt  to  "run  past"  the  forts. 
We  often  hear  this  spoken  of  as  a  probable  form  of  at- 
tack, due  possibly  to  the  fact  that  during  the  Civil  War 
Admiral  Farragut  gained  great  prominence  by  his  success- 
ful engagements  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  River 
and  Mobile  Bay,  in  both  of  which  cases  the  form  of  attack 
used  was  the  ''run  past." 

Conditions  have  changed  greatly  in  the  last  fifty 
years.  In  our  day  armored  ships  are  very  costly  to  build 
and  require  considerable  time — two  or  three  years  being 
needed  for  the  construction  of  a  single  battleship,  each 
vessel  representing  an  expenditure  of  from  $15,000,000  to 
$20,000,000.  It  is  manifestly  inadvisable  to  risk  the  loss  of 
a  ship  representing  such  an  enormous  outlay  and  requiring 
such  a  length  of  time  to  construct,  unless  an  adequate  re- 


1 8       ATTACK   AND   D^F^NS^   OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

turn  is  gained.  Such  a  return  is  impossible  of  achievement 
in  that  manner — a  '*run  past." 

A  concrete  example  is  always  clearer  than  a  purely 
abstract  one.  We  will  therefore  assume  that  the  United 
States  is  engaged  in  a  war  with  China,  and  that  the 
Chinese  fleet  has  appeared  in  the  Strait  of  Juan  de  Fuca. 
The  objective  of  that  fleet  would  be  two-fold — viz.,  the 
capture  of  the  great  commercial  cities  of  Puget  Sound,  to 
lay  them  under  tribute,  and  the  naval  station  at  Brem- 
erton, as  a  base  of  operations.  It  would  be  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  Chinese  admiral  that  he  immediately 
obtain  a  suitable  base  with  all  the  necessary  facilities  for 
refitting  the  fleet. 

If  he  should  succeed  in  running  past  the  forts  at  the 
entrance  to  Puget  Sound,  he  would  find  his  fleet  effectually 
bottled  up,  because  we  would  still  hold  the  forts,  which 
are  the  key  to  the  entire  situation.  To  all  intents  and 
purposes,  therefore,  Seattle  is  an  inland  city,  one  hundred 
and  fifty  miles  from  the  ocean.  It  can  thus  be  seen  that 
before  the  capture  of  Seattle,  Tacoma,  or  the  Navy  Yard 
is  possible,  or  before  they  can  be  put  to  a  practical  use  by 
the  enemy,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  he  first  shall  have 
reduced  and  taken  possession  of  these  forts.  Thus  it  is 
manifest  that  a  "run  past"  would  subject  the  vessels  of 
the  fleet  to  very  grave  dangers  without  the  accomplish- 
ment of  any  good. 

Commenting  upon  the  folly  of  a  *'run  past,"  even  if 
successfully  accomplished,  the  Naial  and  Military  Record 
(English)  says: 

"As  many  mice  have  learnt  to  their  cost,  it  is  one 
thing  to  get  into  a  trap  and  quite  another  to  get  out."* 

*  Journal  of  the    United   States   Artillery,    September-October, 
1915,  p.  234- 


ATTACK  AND  DEFEJNSlS   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        1 9 

It  was  an  interesting  fact,  disclosed  at  the  time  of  the 
surrender  of  Santiago,  Cuba,  that  "prior  to  the  dedara- 
tion  of  war  there  was  not  a  single  modern  gun  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor;  nothing  but  obsolete  ordnance, 
nearly  every  piece  of  which  was  more  than  a  hundred 
years  old."* 

Even  the  few  rifled  guns  which  were  mounted  after 
the  beginning  of  the  war  were,  for  the  most  part,  anti- 
quated weapons,  removed  from  the  obsolete  cruiser, 
Reina  Mercedes^  whidi  was  in  the  harbor  at  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities.  And  yet,  with  this  very  inferior  armament. 
Admiral  Sampson  did  not  dare  risk  the  loss  of  any  of  his 
armored  ships  by  forcing  an  entrance  into  the  harbor,  so 
long  as  the  Spanish  fleet  was  still  afloat. 

Every  armored  ship  needlessly  lost  in  war  is  virtually  a 
gain  of  two  for  the  enemy. 

There  is  one  condition  of  an  attack,  however,  under 
which  a  ''run  past"  might  be  justifiable;  that  is  the 
sending  in  of  a  raiding  expedition  consisting  of  small  craft 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  some  specific  place,  or  to 
create  a  certain  amount  of  demoralization  among  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
consider  the  possibility  of  this  form  of  attack  in  making 
our  dispositions  for  the  defense  of  a  harbor. 

Aerial  Attack. 

While  there  have  apparently  been  no  operations 
against  the  coast  fortifications  during  the  present  war  in 
Europe  involving  the  use  of  aerial  fleets,  yet  the  ease  with 
which  dirigibles  have  been  able  to  drop  bombs  in  various 
cities  of  England  and  on  the  Continent  would  seem  to 
indicate  a  certain  value  for  this  purpose.     The  military 

*Sargent,  "Campaign  of  Santiago,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  222. 


20       ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

value  of  both  the  aeroplane  and  the  dirigible  has  become 
so  definitely  established  in  the  course  of  the  present  war 
that  they  must  certainly  be  reckoned  with  in  connection 
with  our  system  of  coast  defense.  Like  a  bombardment 
from  the  sea,  however,  a  purely  aerial  attack  must  of 
necessity  prove  barren  of  decisive  results. 

Combined  Land  and  Naval  Attack. 

The  form  of  attack  that  would  undoubtedly  produce 
the  best  results  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  invading 
force  would  consist  of  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack. 
In  all  probabihty  the  fleet  would  lie  just  within  extreme 
range,  and  open  fire  on  the  forts  for  the  ptupose  of  keeping 
the  artillerymen  at  their  posts.  In  the  meantime  a  land 
force  would  undertake  a  determined  attack  on  the  land 
front  of  the  forts. 

Aeroplanes  of  a  suitable  type  would  unquestionably 
be  utilized  for  reconnaissance  purposes,  and  these,  with 
the  possible  addition  of  dirigibles,  might  actually  partic- 
ipate in  the  attack  upon  the  forts. 

VAI.UE  OF  Smai^i.  Islands. 

It  is  manifest  that  if  our  fortifications  are  situated 
on  small  islands,  there  is  no  land  front,  and  hence  such 
forts  are  well-nigh  impregnable.  Thus,  as  stated  before, 
the  latest  and  best  thought  in  the  matter  of  coast  defense  in- 
volves, wherever  it  is  practicable y  the  location  of  the  forts  on 
small  islands,  which  virtually  have  no  land  front  at  all, 
and  where  the  enemy  must  cross  a  water  area  before  he 
can  effect  a  landing. 

There  is  no  more  easily  defended  line  than  a  shore 
line,  and  no  more  difficult  one  to  attack,  as  the  water 
offers  absolutely  no  protection  for  the  troops  advancing 


ATTACK  AND  DBI^ENS]^   0I^  I^ORTll^lED  HARBORS.       21 

in  Open  boats.  These  facts  were  brought  out  and  em- 
phasized most  clearly  in  the  landing  of  the  British  troops 
upon  V  Beach  at  Sedd-el-Bahr  in  the  Dardanelles  cam- 
paign. In  spite  of  the  clever  stratagem  resorted  to  in  the 
use  of  the  old  sliip,  River  Clyde y  apparently  abandoned  and 
drifting  aimlessly  ashore,  yet  containing,  like  the  famous 
wooden  horse  of  Troy,  the  forces  of  the  invader,  it  was 
still  necessary  to  advance  over  some  twenty  yards  of  open 
water,  where  no  protection  whatever  could  be  had.  Al- 
though the  landing  was  effected,  the  losses  were  terrific — 
exceeding  two- thirds  of  the  strength  of  the  command,  and 
out  of  all  proportion  to  the  very  meager  results  achieved- 
The  use  of  small  islands  for  the  location  of  coast  de- 
fenses has  received  its  greatest  development  in  the  solution 
of  the  problem  for  the  defense  of  Manila  Bay,  where  all 
the  forts  are  situated  on  a  chain  of  islands  stretching 
across  the  mouth  of  the  bay.  Of  these.  El  Fraile  is  a 
mere  rock,  rising  but  a  few  feet  above  the  water.  Its 
armament  consists  in  14-inch  guns  mounted  in  turrets 
on  the  same  principle  as  the  guns  of  a  battleship  and 
6-  inch  guns  mounted  in  casemates .  The  other  islands, 
Corregidor,  Carabao,  and  Caballo,  rise  precipitously  from 
the  water,  and  an  effective  landing  upon  them  by  attack- 
ing troops  would  be  well-nigh  impossible.  Even  though 
a  landing  might  be  effected,  the  attack  itself  would  prove 
as  fruitless  and  as  disastrous  as  the  British  attacks  upon 
the  GalHpoli  Peninsula  in  the  Dardanelles  campaign. 

Coast  Dei^Snses  of  Puge:t  Sound. 
The  defenses  of  Puget  Sound  proper  consist  of  Forts 
Worden,  Flagler,  and  Casey.  Fort  Worden  is  situated  on 
the  headland  forming  the  northeast  extremity  of  the 
Quimper  Peninsula.  Fort  Casey  is  situated  on  Admiralty 
Head,  Whidby  Island,  an  island  so  large  as  to  be,  to  all 


^2       AWACK  AND  D:^1^BNS^   01^  l^ORTIFIKD  HARBORS. 

intents  afnd  purposes,  a  portion  of  the  mainland.  Fort 
Flagler  occupies  the  northern  end  of  Marrowstone  Island, 
of  sufficiently  small  area  to  come  within  the  latest  idea  of 
coast  fortification.  Fort  Worden  has  a  very  large  land 
front  to  defend;  so  has  Fort  Casey.  To  defend  either  of 
these  forts  from  the  land  side  would  require  a  consid- 
erable number  of  men  and  more  or  less  permanent  works. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  a  comparatively  simple 
matter  to  prevent  an  invading  army  from  landing  on 
Marrowstone  Island;  therefore  Fort  Flagler  is  decidedly 
the  easiest  to  defend  against  land  attack. 

The  situation  might  even  be  conceived  to  arise  that 
Forts  Worden  and  Casey  would  succumb  to  a  combined 
land  and  naval  attack ;  but  in  this  event  Fort  Flagler 
would  remain  in  action,  and  would  present  the  original 
problem  to  the  commander  of  the  attacking  force.  Of 
course,  there  is  this  handicap  that  must  be  considered :  it 
would  be  possible  to  turn  some  of  the  guns  and  certainly 
the  mortars  of  Worden  and  Casey  on  Flagler,  unless  our 
gunners  were  able  to  destroy  them  before  the  evacua- 
tion of  these  forts. 

Still,  it  is  naturally  within  the  range  of  possibility, 
or  even  of  probability,  that  Flagler  could  hold  out  for  an 
indefinite  period  after  Worden  and  Casey  had  succumbed, 
and  so  the  Sound  would  still  be  bottled  up.  This  illus- 
trates the  great  advantage  of  fortifications  being  situated 
on  small  islands — in  fact,  there  are  well-informed  officers 
who  believe  that  all  of  the  Puget  Sound  coast  defenses 
should  be  concentrated  at  Fort  Flagler. 

Summary. 
To  summarize,  it  is  apparent  that  it  is  impossible  to 
fortify  the  entire  coast  line.     The  points  selected  for  per- 


ATTACK  AND  D^FENSH   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       23 

manent  fortifications  are  those  of  importance  from  a  com- 
mercial or  strategic  point  of  view,  and  often  from  both. 
In  locating  the  fortifications  themselves,  we  are  governed 
by  the  possible  form  of  naval  attack  to  which  they  may 
be  subjected.  These,  we  have  found,  would  be  the  bom- 
bardment, a  ''run  past,"  an  aerial  attack,  or  a  combined 
land  and  naval  attack;  the  only  one  of  which  that  prom- 
ises any  degree  of  success  being  the  last  named.  Conse- 
quently the  disposition  of  our  defenses  should  be  made 
with  a  view  to  resisting  such  an  attack.  This  manifestly 
can  be  done  to  best  advantage  by  the  location  of  the 
fortifications  upon  small  islands,  where  they  will  have 
no  land  front. 


24       ATTACK   AND   DEFENSE    OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Navai,  Attack. 


Kinds  of  Navai^  Attack. 

Several  methods  of  attack  are  open  to  the  choice  of 
the  commander  of  the  hostile  fleet,  but  it  may  be  laid 
down  as  a  general  principle  that  the  method  to  be  adopted 
will  be  that  which  will  promise  the  greatest  dispersion  of  the 
fire  of  the  forts, 

'* Run  Past:' 

For  example,  assuming  that  he  has  decided  to  under- 
take a  **run  past,*'  which  form  of  attack,  for  reasons  al- 
ready stated,  is  not  promising  of  decisive  results,  it  would 
be  the  height  of  folly  for  him  to  send  in  one  ship  at  a  time, 
upon  which  every  gun  of  the  coast  defenses  could  be  con- 
centrated. His  formation,  therefore,  would  be  such  as  to 
give  him  the  greatest  opportunity  to  bring  into  action  the 
maximum  number  of  guns,  at  the  same  time  forcing  the 
defenders  on  shore  to  scatter  their  fire. 

It  is  safe  to  say  that,  without  an  adequate  landing 
force,  the  only  form  of  attack  that  could  promise  any 
degree  of  success  would  be  a  ''run  past,"  following  upon 
a  determined  and  long-continued  bombardment.  How- 
ever, for  reasons  already  stated,  such  a  form  of  attack 
would  not  be  good  i  trategy. 

Should  it,  however,  be  undertaken,  a  dark  night 
would  be  chosen — preferably  one  when  the  advantage  of 


ATTACK   AND   DEJFKNSE)   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.       25 

darkness  would  be  further  accentuated  by  the  presence  of 
fog  or  a  heavy  mist,  because  a  fog  quickly  absorbs  search- 
light beams  and  renders  them  entirely  non-effective;  in 
fact,  it  has  been  demonstrated  in  joint  Army  and  Navy 
coast  defense  exercises  that  the  use  of  searchlights  on  a 
foggy  night  is  a  positive  aid  to  the  attacking  fleet,  for  the 
reason  that,  while  valueless  to  the  defense,  their  presence 
is  made  manifest  to  the  attackers,  who  are  thereby  ena- 
bled to  orient  themselves  with  some  degree  of  accuracy. 
The  preliminary  operations  would  involve  a  dragging  of 
the  mine-fields,  with  either  the  cutting  of  cables  or  de- 
struction of  the  mines.  Then,  under  cover  of  the  thick 
weather,  the  fleet  would  be  disposed  in  two  or  more 
columns,  and  the  ''run  past"  attempted. 

It  is  quite  reasonable  to  argue  that  under  these  cir- 
cumstances the  attack  would  be  successful,  in  so  far  as 
getting  the  fleet  past  the  forts  would  be  concerned;  but, 
after  all,  the  forts  would  be  still  in  our  possession,  the 
fleet  would  be  bottled  up  in  the  Sound,  and  little  good 
would  have  been  accomplished. 

There  is  another  manifest  disadvantage  in  this  form 
of  attack.  While  the  thick  weather  would  be  very  bene- 
ficial in  covering  the  movements  of  the  fleet,  and  possi- 
bly in  preventing  detection  of  such  a  movement  from  the 
shore,  yet  the  complications  involved  in  the  matter  of 
navigation  must  be  apparent  even  to  a  layman.  With 
the  changes  of  course  that  are  necessary  in  coming  in 
from  the  strait  until  well  past  Fort  Flagler,  the  skill  of  a 
captain  or  pilot  thoroughly  familiar  with  these  waters  and 
handling  but  a  single  vessel  is  often  taxed  to  the  utmost; 
in  fact,  it  is  no  uncommon  thing  for  vessels  regularly  en- 
gaged in  the  Sound  trade  to  go  ashore  in  thick  weather  on 


26        ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

Point  Wilson,  Point  Hudson,  or  Marrowstone  Point,  all 
in  the  vicinity  of  Forts  Worden  and  Flagler. 

The  difficulties  encountered  by  a  single  vessel  navi- 
gating in  thick  weather  and  with  all  the  regular  aids  to 
navigation  would  be  immensely  increased  by  the  nu- 
merous vessels  of  the  fleet  and  the  fact  that  the  usual  aids 
to  navigation  would  be  no  longer  available  in  time  of  war. 
The  danger  involved  in  the  loss  of  vessels  by  collision  or 
grounding  would  be  so  great  as  to  make  this  form  of 
operation  almost  prohibitive. 

Blockade, 

A  blockade,  while  not  a  form  of  naval  attack,  is  yet  a 
recognized  phase  of  naval  operations  against  a  fortified 
port.  The  object  to  be  gained  is  to  prevent  vessels  either 
entering  or  leaving  the  port.  Any  vessel  attempting  to 
do  so,  regardless  of  its  nationality,  is  subject  to  capture 
or  destruction.  As  vessels  of  a  neutral  nation  may  be 
involved,  it  has  become  a  definite  principle  of  interna- 
tional law  that  a  blockade,  to  be  recognizedy  must  be 
effective. 

The  vessels  of  the  blockading  fleet  would  therefore 
be  so  disposed  as  to  best  observe  the  entrance  and  to  take 
such  effective  measures  as  circumstances  might  demand 
in  the  event  of  an  attempt  to  run  the  blockade.  While 
operations  of  this  character  often  involve  an  interchange 
.  of  shots  between  the  fleet  and  the  shore  defenses,  yet,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  blockading  vessels  will  be  beyond  ex- 
treme range,  especially  in  clear  weather  and  in  daylight. 

At  the  time  of  the  blockade  of  Cervera's  fleet  in  San- 
tiago harbor,  the  American  fleet  was  stationed  off  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor.  In  the  daytime  the  various  vessels 
cruised  up  and  down  the  coast,  one  or  more  being  left  to 


ATTACK   AND   DEJF^NS^   OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        27 

guard  the  entrance.  At  night  the  vessels  were  disposed 
in  the  form  of  a  semicircle,  the  center  of  which  was  Morro 
Castle.  Each  ship  directed  its  searchlights  fixedly  on  the 
entrance  to  the  harbor,  so  that  any  vessel  which  might 
attempt  to  escape  would  be  immediately  and  brilliantly 
illumiliated. 

It  is  a  fixed  and  definite  principle  of  naval  warfare  that 
no  admiral  would  dare  risk  the  loss  of  one  of  his  armored 
ships  without  obtaining  an  adequate  return  in  the  matter  of 
destruction  inflicted  upon  the  enemy. 

It  may  therefore  be  taken  for  granted  that  whatever 
preparatory  formation  the  Chinese  admiral  would  take  in 
an  attack  upon  the  coast  defenses  of  Puget  Sound  would 
be  such  as  to  give  him  adequate  protection  from  a  sortie 
on  the  part  of  our  naval  forces,  as  well  as  ample  warning 
of  any  such  attempt. 

Bombardment, 

A  bombardment  is  a  form  of  attack  in  which  a  heavy 
and  destructive  fire  is  opened  by  the  ships  of  the  fleet 
against  the  shore  defenses,  with  the  object  of  silencing  the 
guns,  destroying  fire-control  stations,  searchlights,  and 
other  elements  of  the  auxiliary  defense,  and  setting  fire 
to  anything  of  an  inflammable  nature  in  the  forts. 

While  the  effect  of  a  bombardment  may  be  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  demoralizing  to  the  personnel,  it  can  never 
be  relied  upon,  unsupported  by  a  land  attack,  to  effect 
the  reduction,  surrender,  or  evacuation  of  the  fort. 

During  the  Spanish- American  War  there  were  several 
engagements  between  our  fleet  and  the  Spanish  coast  de- 
fenses; none  of  these  proved  effective  until  the  combined 
land  and  naval  attack  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  forced  Cer- 
vera's  fleet  to  leave  the  harbor,  only  to  be  destroyed  in  a 


28       ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

purely  naval  engagement,  and  resulted  in  the  fall  of  the 
city  to  American  arms. 

The  attack  by  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  upon  the  de- 
fenses of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  May  12,  1898,  resulted  in 
the  heaviest  loss  of  life  that  our  Navy  sustained  in  the 
entire  war,  and  yet  the  results  obtained  from  the  bom- 
bardment (which  lasted  practically  all  day),  from  a  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  were  nil. 

A  very  few  years  after  the  Spanish-American  War 
the  writer  was  stationed  at  San  Juan,  and  actually  had 
difficulty  in  discovering  any  evidences  of  Sampson's  bom- 
bardment. His  attention  finally  was  directed  to  a  hole 
left  by  a  three-pounder  shell  in  the  brick  wall  of  the 
officers'  quarters  at  Fort  San  Cristobal,  from  which  the 
projectile  had  recently  been  removed  by  a  relic-hunter. 

It  is  true  that  one  corner  of  the  infantry  barracks  had 
been  destroyed  by  a  bursting  shell,  and  a  few  small  build- 
ings in  the  city  beyond  had  been  wrecked,  but  as  far  as 
any  effect  upon  the  fortifications  in  the  way  of  their 
reduction  was  concerned,  they  stand  to-day  as  they  have 
stood  for  the  last  three  centuries — impregnable  to  a  purely 
naval  attack. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  state  that  these  fortifications 
are  of  masonry,  following  the  Vauban  or  bastion  system. 
The  armament,  however,  was  modern,  comprising  ijs- 
centimeter  Hontoria  guns  and  24-centimeter  mortars. 

Having  learned  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  not  in  San 
fuan  harbor,  and  realizing  the  ineffectiveness  of  a  con- 
tinued bombardment  without  the  cooperation  of  an  ade- 
quate landing  force,  Admiral  Sampson  proceeded  else- 
where in  search  of  Cervera. 

A  form  of  bombardment  for  which  there  ^are  nu- 
merous historic  precedents,  and  therefore  very  likely  to  be 


ATTACK   AND   D^I^KNSE   OF   FORTlFlEjD   HARBORS.       29 

adopted,  would  be  for  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  to  be  disposed 
in  one  or  more  columns,  steaming  in  loops  at  nearly  ex- 
treme range,  so  as  to  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the  fire 
from  shore.  As  each  vessel  would  arrive  at  a  prearranged 
point  in  the  circumference  of  the  loop,  a  broadside  would 
be  fired  at  the  batteries  of  the  nearest  fort. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  demoralizing  effect  of  a 
rain  of  several  tons  of  steel  bursting  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  batteries;  yet  something  more  than  de- 
moralization of  the  garrison  is  required  to  secure  the  sur- 
render or  evacuation  of  a  coast-defense  fort.  The  same 
principle  obtains  in  the  attack  of  a  fort  as  applies  on  the 
field  of  battle:  there  must  not  only  be  a  superiority  of 
fire  long  sustained,  but  there  must  be  a  body  of  good  in- 
fantry, or  troops  serving  as  infantry,  who  can  carry  the 
position  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 

The  gun  crews  in  the  disappearing  batteries,  however, 
are  as  well  protected  as  is  possible,  and  as  long  as  casu- 
alties can  be  kept  down,  they  doubtless  would  become 
accustomed  quickly  to  being  the  target  of  the  fleet. 

As  already  stated,  the  damage  that  can  be  accom- 
plished by  such  a  fire  against  coast  fortifications  is  not 
such  as  to  disable  the  batteries. 

Reconnaissance  in  Force, 

Another  form  of  attack,  similar  to  a  bombardment, 
is  the  reconnaissance  in  force.  In  this  case  the  fleet  would 
lie  at  about  extreme  range  and  open  fire  on  the  forts,  with 
a  view  to  drawing  their  fire  in  return,  and  thus  disclose  the 
position  of  the  various  batteries. 

A  reconnaissance  in  force  at  night  is  conducted  under 
exactly  similar  circumstances,  but  has  for  its  object  more 
especially  the  determination  of  the  location  of  all  search- 
lights. 


30     attack  and  d^f^ns^  of  fortified  harbors. 

Aeriai,  Attack. 
Closely  allied  to  a  bombardment  from  the  sea  is  an 
aerial  attack.  This  would  be  conducted  by  such  air-craft 
as  would  accompany  the  expedition,  and  would  consist  ot 
the  dropping  of  bombs  into  the  fortification,  with  a  view 
to  destroying  or  rendering  unserviceable  the  guns  and 
other  means  of  defense,  demoralizing  the  personnel,  and 
setting  fire  to  buildings  of  an  inflammable  character.  As 
far  as  accomplishing  any  decisive  results  is  concerned, 
they  are  impossible  of  attainment  from  an  aerial  attack 
unsupported  by  a  large  landing  force. 

Probable  Form  of  Attack. 
It  is  highly  probable  that  in  an  attack  on  the  coast 
defenses  of  Puget  Sound,  the  first  phase  of  the  action 
would  involve  a  bombardment;  this  for  the  double  pur- 
pose of  developing  the  strength  and  location  of  the  de- 
fenses, and  of  causing  as  much  damage  as  practicable. 
This  would  be  followed  up  by  a  similar  bombardment 
or,  more  properly,  reconnaissance  in  force,  at  night,  for 
the  purpose  of  disclosing  the  number  and  location  of  all 
searchlights.  Having  obtained  the  desired  information, 
it  is  highly  probable  an  attack  would  be  made  by  small 
landing  parties  under  cover  of  darkness,  to  disable  or  de- 
stroy outlying  searchlights  and  fire-control  stations,  with 
a  view  to  seriously  crippling  the  defense  as  a  preliminary 
to  the  general  action,  of  whatever  form  might  have  been 
determined  upon. 

VUI.NKRABIUTY  OF  STATIONS. 

There  is  one  feature  of  the  defenses  that  is  somewhat 
vulnerable — namely,  the  fire-control  stations,  without  the 
use  of  which  the  fighting  of  the  batteries  would  be  greatly 


ATTACK  AND   D^Fl^NSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.       3 1 

handicapped,  and  mortar  batteries  would  be  virtually  put 
out  of  action,  so  dependent  are  they  upon  the  fire-control 
equipment. 

This  vulnerability  of  stations  is  the  more  deplorable 
because,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  it  is  so  absolutely 
unnecessary.  For  example,  when  a  station  could  be 
buried  in  the  side  of  a  hill  (every  part  of  it  being  con- 
cealed, save  only  the  observing  window,  which  could  be 
disguised  and  made  to  resemble  a  natural  crevice  in  the 
hillside),  there  is  no  excuse  for  locating  the  stations  on 
top  of  the  hill,  clearly  outlined  against  the  sky,  as  is  now 
the  case.  Where  they  cannot  be  concealed,  they  ought 
to  be  disguised. 

An  instance  of  the  effective  use  of  a  disguise  may  be 
cited  from  the  joint  Army  and  Navy  maneuvers  held  on 
.  the  Atlantic  Coast  in  1902.  A  secondary  station  per- 
taining to  one  of  the  batteries  in  Portland  harbor  was 
located  on  a  neighboring  island.  It  was  an  improvised 
affair,  consisting  simply  of  a  rough  shack,  erected  by  the 
men,  of  weather-beaten  lumber,  right  on  the  beach.  A 
crude  sign,  **  Bathing  Suits  for  Hire,'*  was  put  up  on  the 
side  of  the  building  by  way  of  disguise.  Early  in  the 
maneuver  week  a  landing  party  from  the  attacking  fleet 
seized  and  occupied  the  island,  but  never  discovered  the 
existence  of  a  fire-control  station.  For  the  entire  re- 
maining period  of  the  maneuvers  the  ** bath-house"  on 
the  beach  continued  to  be  an  effective  element  of  the 
defense. 

It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  fleet  commander 
would  make  every  effort  to  destroy  as  many  fire-control 
stations  as  possible  before  entering  upon  the  decisive 
phases  of  the  attack. 


32       ATTACK  AND   DEJFENSE)   OF  FORTIIM^D    HARBORS. 

Operations  on  run  B:ei.GiAN  Coast. 

A  new  type  of  vessel  of  very  light  draught,  somewhat 
resembling  a  monitor,  has  been  developed  by  the  British 
during  the  present  war.  These  vessels  are  more  on  the 
order  of  floating  batteries  than  warships,  and  are  said  to 
be  manned  by  detachments  of  coast  artillery  troops, 
under  the  command  of  coast  artillery  ofl&cers,  instead  of 
naval  complements.  These  vessels,  or  floating  batteries, 
have  been  performing  very  effective  service  in  supporting 
the  left  flank  of  the  Allied  line  on  the  western  battle  front, 
and  in  harassing  the  Germans  occupying  the  coast  of 
Belgium;  yet,  in  spite  of  the  powerful  15-inch  gun  with 
which  each  vessel  is  armed,  these  monitors  have,  so  far  as 
reports  indicate,  been  unable  to  accomplish  any  decisive 
results  in  their  attacks  upon  coast  fortifications. 

C0NCI.US10N. 

In  the  consideration  of  naval  attack  upon  coast  forti" 
fications,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  two  facts  stand  out 
clearly : 

First,  That  battleships  are  built  primarily  to  fight 
with  other  battleships  and  therefore  are  not  the  match  of 
adequate  coast  defenses  fully  manned  by  trained  troops. 

Second.  The  only  form  of  attack  that  promises  suc- 
cess to  the  invader  through  the  reduction  and  capture  of 
coast  defenses  of  a  fortified  harbor  is  a  combined  land  and 
naval  attack. 


ATTACK  AND  D^F^NSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.       33 


CHAPTER  III. 


Defense  Against  Naval,  Attack. 


Let  us  assume  that  a  state  of  war  exists  with  a  first- 
class  over-sea  naval  power.  What  are  the  means  at 
our  disposal  for  resisting  an  attack  by  a  fleet  upon  our 
fortifications? 

ClyASSlFlCATlON  OF  CoAST  DEFENSE. 

The  means  of  defense  resolve  themselves  into  several 
different  classifications. 

Primarily,  there  is  the  artillery  defense,  which  in  turn 
is  divided,  with  reference  to  the  kinds  of  fire,  into  guns 
and  mortars,  and  with  reference  to  weight  and  caliber, 
into  the  major,  intermediate,  and  minor  armament. 

Secondly,  there  is  the  submarine  defense,  comprising 
mines,  torpedoes,  and  the  operations  of  submarine  boats. 

Thirdly,  there  is  the  aerial  defense,  as  provided  by 
aeroplanes  and  dirigibles. 

Fourthly,  there  are  the  various  auxiliaries,  comprising 
searchlights,  power-plants,  fire-control  stations,  signal  sta- 
tions, picket-  and  patrol-boats,  etc. 

Artii^lery  Defense. 

Guns, 
The  fimction  of  guns  is  to  attack  the  sides  of  in- 
coming vessels;  to  this  end  guns  are  so  constructed  as  to 
fire  heavy  forged  steel  projectiles  at  high  muzzle  veloci- 


34       ATTACK  AND   DKI^^NSE    OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

ties,  capable  of  penetrating  or  shattering  armor  plate  at 
a  very  considerable  range.  The  kind  of  fire  used  with 
guns  is  known  as  ** direct  fire" — that  is  to  say,  where  the 
angle  of  elevation  does  not  exceed  15°. 

Mortars. 

Mortars,  on  the  contrary,  are  fired  at  high  elevations, 
varying  between  45°  and  65°.  They  throw  the  projectile 
to  a  great  height  (sometimes  as  high  as  five  miles),  and 
are  calculated  to  strike  the  enemy's  ships  upon  the  decks. 
It  is  easy  to  imagine  the  effect  that  would  be  produced 
by  a  thousand-pound  projectile,  loaded  with  a  high  ex- 
plosive, falling  from  an  altitude  of  five  miles  and  striking 
upon  the  deck  of  a  battleship.  There  are  few,  if  any, 
ships  in  the  navies  of  the  world  that  carry  sufficient  deck 
protection  to  prevent  such  projectiles  piercing  their  decks 
and  bursting  in  their  vitals. 

The  effectiveness  of  mortars,  assuming  an  accuracy 
of  fire,  is  thus  very  apparent. 

Mortars  possess  a  further  advantage  over  guns.  The 
effectiveness  of  a  projectile  is  measured  by  its  striking  energy y 
which  is  dependent  upon  two  factors — its  mass,  and  the 
square  oj  the  velocity  at  the  instant  it  strikes.  With  gun-fire, 
the  velocity  starts  to  fall  off  the  instant  the  projectile 
leaves  the  muzzle,  and  consequently  the  greater  the  range 
the  smaller  the  striking  velocity,  and  hence  the  less  the 
effectiveness  of  the  projectile.  On  the  contrary,  with 
mortars  the  striking  velocity,  due  to  the  fall  of  the  pro- 
jectile from  a  great  height,  is  substantially  equal  to  the 
muzzle  velocity,  and  consequently  as  the  elevation  in- 
creases the  effectiveness  of  mortar-fire  increases.  As  mor- 
tars use  a  system  of  fire  whereby  the  weight  of  the  powder 
charge  increases  with  an  increasing  range,  it  will  therefore 


o 

M 


o 
>* 
w 

H 

<: 
PQ 


ATTACK   AND   DHFBNSH    OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        35 

appear  that  the  effect  of  a  projectile  striking  a  ship  will 
be  the  maximum  when  fired  at  the  maximum  elevation 
of  65°  with  the  largest  powder  charge,  or  at  the  innermost 
limit  of  the  outermost  zone.  This  would  be  at  a  range  of 
some  ten  thousand  yards. 

Furthermore,  the  mortar,  with  an  increasing  striking 
velocity  with  increasing  range,  is  attacking  the  relatively 
light  armor  of  the  protective  deck ;  while  the  gun,  with  a 
striking  velocity  that  decreases  with  increasing  range,  is 
attacking  the  relatively  heavy  armor  of  the  turrets  and 
sides  of  the  ships. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  while  we  cannot  in  any  sense  of 
the  word  dispense  with  guns,  yet  the  most  effective  means 
of  attacking  a  battleship  are  to  be  found  in  those  weapons 
which  attack  from  above  and  below  the  water,  because  a 
battleship  is  least  able  to  resist  such  attacks;  that  is,  the 
use  of  mortar-fire  and  submarine  mines. 

Classification  as  to  Caliber, 

The  artillery  defense  is  classified,  in  accordance  with 
weight  and  caliber,  into  the  major,  intermediate,  and 
minor  armament. 

The  major  armament  consistsof  16-,  14-,  12-,  10-,  and 
8-inch  guns  and  12 -inch  mortars;  the  intermediate  arma- 
ment of  6-  and  5-inch  guns,  and  the  minor  armament  of 
4.7-,  4-,  and  3 -inch  guns. 

The  present-day  tendency  is  towards  a  reduction  in 
the  number  of  different  calibers.  Thus,  for  example,  as 
concerns  the  Navy,  we  have  become  familiar  in  the  last 
few  years  with  the  ''all-big-gun"  battleship  of  the  dread- 
naught  or  super-dreadnaught  type.  Formerly  it  was  no 
uncommon  thing  for  a  battleship  to  be  armed  with  four 
12-inch,  eight  8-inch,  twelve  7-inch,  and  twenty  3-inch 


36       ATTACK  AND   DlSl^lSNS^   OF  FORTlFmD   HARBORS. 

guns — as,  for  example,  the  Kansas  class.  Nowadays  a 
battleship  such  as  those  of  the  New  York  class  carries  ten 
14-inch  and  twenty-one  5-inch  guns.  In  other  words,  the 
primary  battery  should  be  provided  with  the  heaviest 
guns  that  the  requirements  of  the  particular  fort  or  ship 
may  demand.  Thus,  as  a  general  rule,  there  is  little  or 
no  use  for  7-,  8-,  and  lo-inch  guns. 

The  14-inch  gim  was  adopted  as  the  standard  large 
caliber  gun  for  our  coast  defenses  as  the  result  of  the  in- 
vestigations and  recommendations  of  the  Taft  Board. 
An  unfortunate  difference  of  expert  opinion  in  the.  service 
resulted  in  a  considerable  loss  of  effectiveness  in  the  first 
guns  of  this  caliber  that  were  built.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
was  contended  that  as  the  energy  of  a  projectile  varied 
with  the  mass  and  the  square  of  the  velocity,  an  increase 
of  mass  would  warrant  a  decrease  in  velocity  without  re- 
ducing the  energy.  The  model  of  1907  14-inch  gun  was 
therefore  built  only  34  calibers  in  length.  Its  muzzle 
velocity  of  2,150  feet  per  second  and  weight  of  project- 
ile of  1,660  pounds  were  calculated  to  give  the  same  muz- 
zle energy  as  the  12 -inch  40-caliber  gun,  model  of  1900, 
firing  a  1,046-pound  projectile,  with  a  muzzle  velocity  of 
2,250  feet  per  second.  The  only  advantage  thus  gained 
lay  in  the  fact  of  a  longer  life  for  the  gun  and  consequent 
saving  in  cost — a  consideration,  when  applied  to  items  of 
national  defense,  that  ought  not  to  be  a  controlling  factor. 
Further,  whatever  advantage,  however  questionable,  was 
gained,  was  more  than  offset  by  a  loss  in  accuracy,  due  to 
the  more  curved  trajectory  which  resulted  from  the  de- 
crease in  muzzle  velocity  and  increase  in  mass  of  the  pro- 
jectile. Instead,  therefore,  of  securing  a  more  effective 
weapon  for  use  against  the  ever-increasing  range  and 
power  of  naval  guns  and  effectiveness  of  armor,  there  was 


ATTACK  AND   D^I^^NS^   O^   IJ'ORTIFI^D   HARBORS.        37 

produced  a  14-inch  gun  that  was,  in  fact,  not  as  effective 
as  the  1 2 -inch. 

In  the  models  of  1909  and  1910  there  have  been  pro- 
duced more  effective  14-inch  guns,  40  caUbers  in  length, 
and  giving  the  1,660-pound  projectile  the  adopted  stand- 
ard muzzle  velocity  of  2,250  feet  per  second. 

One  of  the  chief  lessons  learned  thus  far  from  the 
present  war  is  the  value  of  long-range  weapons  of  great 
caliber,  the  effect  of  which  upon  our  service  has  been  the 
adoption  of  the  16-inch  45-caliber  gun,  with  a  range 
of  26,000  yards,  as  the  minimum  standard  major  caliber 
gun  for  our  coast  defenses.* 

The  plans  of  the  Endicott  Board  called  for  an  ar- 
mored turret  on  Romer  Shoals  at  the  mouth  of  New  York 
harbor,  in  which  it  was  contemplated  to  mount  two  16- 
inch  guns.  The  construction  of  one  of  these  was  under- 
taken nearly  twenty  years  ago,  but  a  change  in  the  plans, 
whereby  the  Romer  Shoals  turret  was  abandoned,  re- 
sulted in  the  completed  gun  lying  idle  for  many  years  at 
.  the  Sandy  Hook  Proving-ground.  The  Taft  Board  con- 
templated mounting  it  at  Fort  Michie  in  the  coast  de- 
fenses of  Long  Island  Sound,  but  it  has  finally  been  de- 
termined to  install  it,  mounted  on  a  disappearing  carriage, 
as  a  part  of  the  defenses  of  the  Panama  Canal.  This  old 
gun,  however,  is  only  34  calibers  in  length,  and  is  there- 
fore not  in  the  same  class  as  the  new  16-inch  guns  to  be 
built  in  the  futiure. 

For  intermediate  guns  against  unarmored  portions  of 
vessels,  but  chiefly  for  the  protection  of  the  mine-fields, 
the  6-inch  gun  is  eminently  satisfactory. 

In  the  Navy  the  use  of  3 -inch  guns  for  the  secondary 

battery  has  given  way  to  guns  of  5 -inch  caliber,  as  being 

much  more  effective  against  torpedo  attack.    The  3 -inch 

♦Report  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery,  U.  S.  Army,  1915*  P-  9- 


38       ATTACK  AND   DEJFKNS^   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

gun  is  still  looked  upon  with  favor,  however,  from  a  coast 
artillery  point  of  view,  for  repelling  landing  parties  and 
against  torpedo-boats  and  other  small  craft. 

It  may  therefore  be  safely  predicted  that  in  new  for- 

-tifications  the  major  armament  will  consist  of  at  least 

1 6-inch   guns  and  12 -inch  mortars,  mounted,  whenever 

necessary,  for  all-around  fire;  the  intermediate  armament, 

of  6-inch  guns,  and  the  minor  armament,  of  3 -inch  guns. 

Tactical  Organization. 

For  the  tactical  handling  of  guns  in  coast  defenses, 
contiguous  guns  of  the  same  caliber  are  grouped  in  bat- 
teries; contiguous  batteries  covering  the  same  or  adja- 
cent fields  of  fire  are  grouped  into  fire  commands,  all  the 
fire  commands  of  a  fort  constituting  a  fort  command; 
all  the  fort  commands  of  a  given  harbor  constitute  a  coast 
defense  command. 

Rapid-fire  guns  assigned  to  the  protection  of  mine- 
fields, together  with  all  other  elements  of  the  mine  defense 
of  a  fort,  constitute  a  mine  command.  The  mobile  troops 
forming  a  part  of  the  garrison  of  a  coast  artillery  fort, 
whose  function  is  the  protection  of  the  landward  side  of 
the  fort,  form  the  support  command.  Both  of  these  com- 
mands are  coordinate  with  a  fire  command  and  are  sub- 
ordinate to  a  fort  command. 

Submarine  Defense. 

For  submarine  defense  two  forms  of  weapons  are  pro- 
vided—viz., torpedoes  and  mines.  The  torpedo,  which 
has  been  highly  developed  in  our  Navy,  is  virtually  a 
small  submarine  boat  carrying  a  high  explosive,  and 
which  is  discharged  from  a  tube  by  compressed  air  in  the 
direction  of  the  enemy's  ship. 


ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE)   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.       39 

The  submarine  mine  is  peculiarly  adapted  for  coast 
defense,  and  has  received  a  high  development  in  the 
Coast  Artillery  Corps.  Some  of  the  mines  are  spherical 
in  shape,  and  others  are  cylindrical,  with  spherical  ends. 
These  are  loaded  with  a  high  explosive  known  as  ''  trotol," 
and  the  mine  is  controlled  electrically  from  shore.  In  the 
absence  of  electrical  current,  or  in  the  event  of  a  mine 
breaking  loose,  no  possible  harm  can  come  to  friendly 
shipping  from  contact  with  the  mines. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  during  the  late  Russo- 
Japanese  War  a  number  of  friendly  and  neutral  vessels 
were  destroyed  through  coming  in  contact  with  mines 
which  had  broken  loose  from  their  moorings.  Especially 
was  this  true  in  the  vicinity  of  Port  Arthur. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  present  war  floating  contact 
mines  were  set  adrift  in  the  North  Sea  by  the  Germans, 
and  some  vessels  were  destroyed  by  them. 

American  mines  are  eminently  effective  when  needed 
and  absolutely  harmless  when  not  needed ;  in  fact,  it  has 
been  said  that  the  device  for  closing  the  circuit,  thus 
causing  the  current  to  ignite  the  primer  (which  is  a  secret 
piece  of  mechanism),  is  so  perfect  in  its  mechanical  and 
electrical  details  that  it  cannot  fail  to  act. 

The  mines  are  planted  in  groups,  the  number  in  a 
group  being  determined  by  the  number  of  conductors  in 
the  submarine  cable  connected  with  the  shore.  Each 
mine  has  a  separate  panel  on  a  switchboard  in  a  building 
known  as  the  ''mining  casema^te."  On  this  panel  are  the 
necessary  switches  and  electrical  devices  for  the  proper 
manipulation  of  the  mine. 

During  periods  of  watching,  the  switches  in  the 
mining  casemate  are  thrown  in  such  a  manner  that  a 
signal  would  be  given  if  one  of  the  mines  should  be  dis- 


40       ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

turbed  by  a  passing  vessel.  Should  this  be  one  of  the 
enemy,  it  is  but  the  matter  of  a  second  or  two  to  fire  the 
mine  and  destroy  the  vessel. 

In  case  of  fog  or  thick  weather,  when  it  is  impossible 
to  observe  the  mine-field,  or  to  distinguish  whether  ves- 
sels are  friendly  or  hostile,  the  mines  may  be  connected 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  contact  of  a  vessel  with  a  mine, 
instead  of  signaling  to  the  mining  casemate,  would  result 
in  the  instant  explosion  of  the  mine. 

A  third  method  of  mine-firing  is  what  is  known  as 
"judgment  firing.'*  This  is  the  kind  habitually  used  in 
mine  target  practice,  the  results  of  which  have  been  emi- 
nently satisfactory,  a  majority  of  the  mine  companies 
having  made  loo  per  cent  of  hits. 

In  this  method  the  target,  or  hostile  vessel,  is 
** tracked"  on  the  plotting-board.  From  the  line  of  di- 
rection that  is  being  followed,  it  is  easy  to  see  which  mine 
is  being  approached.  From  the  known  speed  of  the 
target  or  vessel,  the  length  of  time  it  will  require  to  reach 
that  mine  is  easily  determined.  Therefore,  at  the  expira- 
tion of  that  time  the  firing-switch  in  the  mining  casemate 
can  be  closed,  and  the  mine  fired  with  the  expectation 
that  the  target  or  vessel  is  within  the  radius  of  destruction. 

The  value  and  effectiveness  of  submarine  boats  in 
conducting  a  raid  against  an  observing  or  blockading  fleet 
has  been  amply  demonstrated  in  the  present  war.  This 
function  of  the  submarine  came  first  into  prominence  with 
the  destruction  of  the  British  armored  cruisers  Aboukir, 
Cressy,  and  Hogue,  in  the  North  Sea.  Numerous  other 
incidents  have  occurred  as  the  war  has  developed,  in- 
cluding the  loss  of  warships  and  transports  of  the  Allies 
engaged  in  the  Dardanelles  campaign,  and  the  more  recent 


ATTACK  AND   D^F^NSK    OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        4I 

destruction  of  German  warships  in  the  Baltic  at  the  hands 
of  British  submarines. 

The  attack  of  German  submarines  upon  unarmed 
merchantmen,  including  passenger  ships,  on  the  high  seas, 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  establishing  a  precedent  for 
civilized  warfare;  yet  the  success  of  these  attacks  has 
demonstrated  the  value  of  the  submarine  in  preventing 
the  running  of  a  legally  established  blockade,  as  well  as 
for  offensive  use  against  a  blockading  or  attacking  fleet. 

Submarines,  although  engaged  ill  coast  defense  opera- 
tions, are  actually  handled  by  the  Navy,  and  form  no 
part  of  the  work  of  the  coast  artillery  troops. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  state  that,  in  some  foreign 
countries,  notably  in  France  and  Germany,  the  entire 
system  of  coast  defense  pertains  to  the  Navy  Department. 
Such  an  arrangement  undoubtedly  results  in  a  better 
coordination  of  all  elements  of  the  seaward  defense. 

A^RIAI,  D^F^NS^. 

Aerial  defense  has  been  mentioned  before  as  a  part 
of  the  general  scheme  of  coast  defense.  While  aerial  navi- 
gation is  of  very  recent  development,  yet  the  experiences 
of  the  present  European  war  have  already  demonstrated 
the  great  value  of  aeroplanes  for  strategic  reconnaissance. 
It  is  believed  that  they  could  render  very  effective  work  of 
this  character  in  connection  with  coast  defense  operations, 
and  also  might  be  of  value  in  the  matter  of  dropping 
explosives  upon  the  decks  of  the  attacking  vessels. 

A  further  use  will  be  found  in  repelling  an  aerial  attack, 
dirigibles  of  the  Zeppelin  type  being  especially  vulnerable 
to  attack  from  above  by  aeroplanes. 

Should  the  attacking  fleet  take  advantkge  of  a  low 
fog  or  of  a  smoke-screen,  aeroplanes  can  be  effectively  used 


42       ATTACK  AND   DHFKNSlS   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

by  flying  over  certain  of  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  and  con- 
forming to  their  course.  The  observers  ''tracking'*  an 
aeroplane  will  enable  the  plotter  to  obtain  a  fairly  ac- 
curate course  of  the  ship  it  represents.  While  the  degree 
of  accuracy  in  range-  and  position-finding  by  this  means 
is  not  as  great  as  when  observations  are  taken  directly 
upon  the  vessels,  yet  it  is  immeasurably  better  than 
nothing. 

Still  another  practical  use  of  aeroplanes  is  to  be  found 
in  connection  with  the  observation  of  the  fire  of  the  shore 
batteries,  and  the  application  of  such  corrections  to  the 
range  as  will  make  that  fire  more  effective. 

AUXIUARY  ElvEMKNTS.  * 

What  might  be  termed  the  ''auxiliaries  of  coast  de- 
fense'*  include  the  fire-control  stations  with  their  equip- 
ment, searchlights,  power-plants,  signal  stations,  and 
picket-  and  patrol-boats. 

By  means  of  the  fire-control  installation,  communica- 
tion is  maintained  between  all  points  of  the  coast  defenses, 
so  that  the  will  of  the  commander  can  readily  be  made 
known  to  the  least  important  subordinate.  This  installa- 
tion also  provides  the  means  for  locating  targets  and 
finding  and  correcting  the  ranges. 

The  use  of  the  searchlight  is  limited  to  night  work  in 
discovering  and  illuminating  the  vessels  of  the  enemy. 

Each  fort  is  provided  with  a  central  power-plant  to 
furnish  power  and  light  for  the  various  elements  of  the 
defenses.  In  addition,  small  emergency  plants,  usually 
equipped  with  internal  combustion  engines,  are  provided 
for  each  battery  or  group  of  batteries  and  for  each  search- 
light.    Signal  stations  are  equipped  for  communication  by 


ATTACK  AND   DEJFKNSE;    OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.       43 

radio,  flag,  heliograph,  lantern,  Ardois,  or  other  authorized 
means  of  signaling. 

Picket-  and  patrol-boats  are  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting raids  on  mine-fields,  and  the  landing  of  small 
parties  to  attack  outlying  searchlights  and  fire-control 
stations.  They  are  especially  valuable  in  thick  weather, 
giving  timely  warning  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 

GENEjRAiy  Defense  Pi.ans. 

In  order  to  properly  handle  the  coast  defenses  so  the 
most  efficient  use  of  the  various  elements  may  be  had, 
general  defense  plans  are  made  in  time  of  peace  and  thor- 
oughly practiced  under  all  conditions  of  weather,  both 
day  and  night,  so  that  the  personnel  is  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  details. 

As  an  instance  of  the  necessity  for  this,  take  the  tac- 
tical handling  of  the  searchlights.  Without  such  a  plan, 
it  is  easy  to  conceive  of  the  lights  being  thrown  about  in 
such  a  manner,  each  independent  of  the  others,  as  to  in- 
terfere one  with  another  and  cause  utter  confusion. 

By  the  use  of  such  a  plan,  certain  outlying  search- 
lights are  designated  as  "barrier  lights."  They  are 
thrown  across  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  intersecting  be- 
yond extreme  range.  No  vessel,  therefore,  could  enter 
the  harbor  without  passing  through  the  beam  of  one  or 
the  other  of  these  lights,  and  would  be  quickly  detected 
by  the  watchers  on  shore.  Instantly  one  or  more  lights 
adjoining  these  outlying  ones  would  be  placed  in  action 
and  directed  upon  the  target.  These  would  follow  it  in> 
while  the  batteries  opened  fire  on  it. 

The  barrier  lights  would  still  remain  covering  the 
harbor  entrance  for  the  purpose  of  illuminating  any  other 
approaching  vessel  of  the  attacking  fleet.     When  the  first 


44   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

vessel  has  passed  far  enough  along  in  the  harbor,  other 
searchlights  will  illuminate  it,  and  other  guns  not  there- 
tofore in  action  will  be  brought  to  bear  on  it. 

In  the  meantime  the  first  lights  will  illuminate  other 
approaching  vessels,  and  the  batteries  first  in  abtion  will 
open  fire  on  them.  By  such  a  means  as  this,  which  is  the 
general  principle  underlying  the  formulation  of  defensive 
planSy  a  target  is  passed  from  fire  command  to  fire  com- 
mand with  a  minimum  of  interference  and  a  maximum  of 
efficiency. 

Function  of  Our  Navy. 

A  question  that  naturally  suggests  itself  in  dis- 
cussing the  means  of  defense  of  our  fortified  harbors  is, 
What  is  the  function  of  our  own  fleet?  It  is  a  well- 
recognized  principle  of  naval  strategy  that  the  function  of  the 
fleet  is  primarily  offensive.  Its  mission  is  to  gain  and  retain 
the  control  of  the  sea.  To  this  end  it  must  cut  loose  from 
its  own  base  and  seek  out  and  destroy  the  enemy's  fleet 
upon  the  high  seas.  If  oiu*  fleet  were  to  be  tied  to  the 
coast-line,  its  strength  would  be  frittered  away  in  small 
driblets,  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  gain  or  retain  the 
all-important  control  of  the  sea.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  so 
long  as  we  hold  this  control,  an  invasion  of  our  territory 
from  across  the  sea  is  practically  impossible. 

■  Therefore y  the  very  best  aid  to  coast  defense  that  our  fleet 
can  render  is  by  offensive  action  well  beyond  the  limit  of 
our  coast. 

There  is  one  way,  however,  in  which  the  Navy  can 
and  will  be  of  inestimable  assistance  in  the  actual  work 
of  coast  defense,  and  that  is  by  means  of  submarines. 
While  these  vessels  serve  under  the  immediate  orders  of 
the  commandants  of  the  naval  districts  into  which  our 


ATTACK  AND   D^I^l^NS^   OF  F^ORTIFIED   HARBORS.       45 

coast-line  is  divided,  they  would  unquestionably  cooperate 
with  the  coast  defense  commander  in  the  general  plan 
of  defense. 

The  Navy,  and  in  all  probability  the  naval  militia, 
could  also  render  most  effective  aid  in  reconnaissance 
work  in  providing  the  necessary  vessels  for  patrol  and 
picket  duty.  These  also  would  operate  under  the  orders 
of  the  naval  commander,  but  would  cooperate  with  the 
coast  defense  commander. 


46   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE)  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Combined  Land  and  Navai^  Attack. 


Most  Promising  Form  of  Attack. 

We  already  have  seen  in  our  discussion  of  the  prob- 
lems connected  with  attack  and  defense  of  our  fortified 
harbors  that  a  purely  naval  attack  will  not  promise  any 
great  degree  of  success.  The  question  naturally  con- 
fronts us,  as  it  would  a  naval  commander,  What  is  the 
form  of  attack  which  would  seem  to  be  most  productive 
of  success? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  simple, — the  actual 
carrying  out  of  the  proposed  plan  may  i'ndeed  be  very 
complex.  The  form  of  attack  which  would  undoubtedly 
be  undertaken,  if  a  serious  attempt  were  made  to  reduce 
the  defenses  of  Puget  Sound,  would  be  a  combined  land 
and  naval  assault. 

Preuminary  Bombardment. 

This  would  involve  a  bombardment  of  the  forts  at 
long  range,  following  upon  a  reconnaissance  in  force. 
The  latter  is  -for  the  purpose  of  developing  the  strength  of 
the  forts  on  their  sea  front,  and  discovering  the  position 
of  all  batteries.  Thus,  when  the  bombardment  which  is 
to  accompany  the  land  attack  is  undertaken,  every  bat- 
tery may  be  made  a  target  for  the  fleet.  All  artillerymen 
would  consequently  be  kept  at  their  posts,  and  would  not 
be  available  for  reinforcements  on  the  land  front. 


An  Expi^osion  op  a  Submarine  Mine. 


attack  and  deji^^nsje  of  i^ortlflkd  harbors.     47 

Landing  of  Troops. 

The  troops  accompanying  the  attacking  fleet  would 
be  landed  at  some  suitable  point,  and  a  march  undertaken 
against  the  land  fronts  of  the  forts. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  this  was  precisely  the  form  of 
attack  used  at  Santiago  during  the  Spanish-American 
War.  The  Fifth  Army  Corps,  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  Shafter,  was  put  ashore  from  transports 
at  Siboney  and  Daiquiri,  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba  and 
a  few  miles  to  the  eastward  of  the  entrance  to  the  har- 
bor of  Santiago. 

The  disembarkation  was  made  under  the  cover  of 
guns  of  the  fleet.  Having  landed,  the  army  pushed  for- 
ward, with  a  view  to  taking  possession  of  the  city  and  in- 
vesting Morro  Castle  on  the  land  side.  The  first  opposi- 
tion was  encountered  at  Las  Guasimas,  where  a  skirmish 
was  fought.  Then  came  the  three-days  fight  at  El  Caney 
and  San  Juan  Hill,  where  the  entire  Spanish  line  was  cap- 
tured and  the  city  placed  at  the  mercy  of  American  arms . 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  last  day  of  the  fight,  when  it 
was  realized  that  American  victory  was  assured,  and  that 
the  harbor  would  no  longer  be  a  safe  place  for  Cervera's 
fleet,  he  put  to  sea  for  the  purpose  of  running  the  gauntlet 
of  the  American  fleet.  The  result  was  the  loss  of  every 
one  of  his  ships. 

During  the  attack  by  General  Shafter's  army,  a  con- 
stant bombardment  of  the  fortifications  was  maintained 
by  the  blockading  fleet.  This  is  a  splendid  example  of 
successful  operations  against  a  fortified  harbor,  when  car- 
ried out  in  the  form  of  a  combined  land  and  naval  assault. 

It  is  true  that  Morro  Castle  itself  was  not  attacked, 
the  capitulation  of  that  fort  being  forced  through  the  fall 
of  the  city  and  the  destruction  of  the  fleet. 


48   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

A  more  recent  instance  of  an  attack  of  this  kind  is  to 
be  found  in  the  Dardanelles  campaign,  now  being  con- 
ducted by  forces  of  the  Quadruple  Entente  against  the 
Turkish  fortifications.  The  objective  of  the  attack  is  the 
city  of  Constantinople,  the  capital  of  the  Turk:ish  Empire, 
situated  on  the  Bosphorus,  between  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
and  the  Black  Sea. 

Two  avenues  of  approach  were  open  to  the  choice  of 
the  attacking  force.  A  landing  might  have  been  effected 
on  the  Turkish  coast  to  the  north  of  the  entrance  to  the 
Dardanelles,  and  an  overland  campaign  by  way  of  the 
Chatalja  lines  undertaken.  The  alternative  plan  involved 
the  passage  of  the  Dardanelles,  necessarily  demanding 
the  reduction  or  capture  of  the  successive  lines  of  coast 
fortifications,  defending  the  strait  on  both  the  European 
and  Asiatic  sides. 

The  former  plan  is  open  to  two  objections — viz.,  the 
lack  of  a  suitable  base  of  operations  on  the  Turkish  coast 
to  the  westward  of  the  Dardanelles,  and  the  strength  of 
the  Chatalja  lines.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  lat- 
ter successfully  sheltered  a  defeated  Turkish  army  for  a 
period  of  six  months  against  the  victorious  Bulgarians 
during  the  first  Balkan  War;  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
present  war  has  clearly  demonstrated  the  ineffectiveness 
of  permanent  land  fortifications  against  modern  heavy 
artillery — as,  for  example,  the  successful  German  attacks 
upon  Liege  and  Antwerp.  There  is  more  than  a  possi- 
bility that  an  attack  upon  Constantinople  by  an  overland 
campaign,  even  though  it  might  have  involved  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  fortifications  of  Adrianople,  as  well  as  the  as- 
sault upon  the  Chatalja  lines,  might  have  been  more  suc- 
cessful than  the  thu^  far  abortive  attempts  to  force  the 
Dardanelles. 


ATTACK   AND   DEFENSE   OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        49 

The  experiences  in  the  Dardanelles  campaign  have 
corroborated  in  detail  the  general  principles  already  enun- 
ciated as  pertaining  to  the  attack  and  defense  of  coast 
fortifications.  Attempts  to  force  a  passage  of  the  straits, 
amounting  virtually  to  a  ''run  past,"  have  been  defeated 
with  heavy  losses,  while  bombardment  of  the  defending 
forts  has  accomplished  nothing,  as  far  as  decisive  results 
are  concerned.  Even  the  combined  land  and  naval  attack 
which  has  been  prosecuted  so  vigorously  for  the  greater 
part  of  a  year  has  not  yet  accomplished  its  purpose.  All 
these  facts  illustrate  the  supreme  difficulties  that  lie  in 
the  way  of  the  capture  or  destruction  of  adequate  and 
well-defended  coast  fortifications. 

SU1TAB1.E  Landing-Place. 

In  making  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack  upon 
the  defenses  of  Puget  Sound,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  commander  of  the  invading  forces  would  pursue 
some  such  plan  as  the  following : 

The  first  essential  requirement  would  be  a  suita- 
ble landing-place.  The  best  possible  point  for  landing 
would  be  Port  Discovery  Bay,  which  is  immediately  to 
the  westward  of  the  Quimper  Peninsula,  on  which  Fort 
Worden  is  situated. 

Experimental  mortar-firing,  conducted  a  few  years 
ago  at  Fort  Worden  over  the  seven  miles  of  intervening 
land  into  the  mouth  of  Port  Discovery  Bay,  has  shown 
conclusively  that  the  effectiveness  of  such  fire  renders 
that  bay  untenable  as  a  landihg-point.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  sixteen  mortars  at  Fort  Worden  effectively  cover 
the  entrance  to  the  bay;  twenty -four  mortars,  including 
the  eight  at  Fort  Flagler,  cover  a  very  considerable  area ; 
and  beyond  the  limit  of  the  Worden  mortars  to  the  south- 


50      ATTACK  AND  D^I^BNSK   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

ward,  the  eight  at  Flagler  cover  the  entire  area  to  the 
head  of  the  bay.  Port  Discovery  Bay  may  therefore  be 
entirely  eliminated  as  a  possible  landing-point  for  the 
enemy. 

This  means  a  longer  and  more  difficult  approach  from 
some  point  farther  to  the  westward.  It  is  possible  that 
Washington  Harbor  would  be  chosen.  Here  would  be 
found  ample  space  on  the  Sequim  prairie  for  the  en- 
campment of  the  troops  and  establishing  of  a  base.  The 
approach  would  then  be  made  by  marching  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  and  around  the  head  of  Port  Discovery- 
Bay,  and  then  approaching  Fort  Worden  from  the  south. 
Of  course,  the  advance  of  the  enemy  would  be  resisted, 
and  every  effort  made  to  prevent  his  carrying  out  his  plans 
to  a  successful  issue. 

March  in  Ene;my*s  Country. 

Having  effected  his  landing  and  established  his  base, 
the  march  would  then  be  taken  up  under  conditions  gov- 
erning the  operation  of  an  army  in  the  enemy's  country. 
An  efficient  service  of  information  would  be  established, 
and  patrols  would  be  sent  out  for  the  double  purpose  of 
gaining  information  concerning  the  defenders  and  to  fa- 
miliarize themselves  with  the  topography  of  the  country. 

On  the  march,  a  strong  advance  guard  would  be  nec- 
essary at  all  times,  and  for  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
way  flank  guards  would  be  maintained  on  parallel  roads. 
Much  of  the  country  over  which  the  invaders  would  be 
obliged  to  operate  is  heavily  wooded;  so  dense  is  the  un- 
dergrowth as  to  make  it  practically  impossible  for  bodies 
of  troops  to  advance,  except  on  the  few  roads  and  trails 
that  exist. 

This  condition  of  affairs  is  a  positive  detriment  to 


ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        5 1 

the  invader,  while  to  the  defenders  it  possesses  both  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages,  the  latter  being  chiefly  in  the 
matter  of  keeping  up  communication  between  different 
points  of  the  line  and  the  assembling  of  reinforcements. 

Meeting  with  Coast  Guard. 

When  the  coast  guard  is  met  in  force,  it  becomes  the 
duty  of  the  commander  of  the  invading  forces  not  only  to 
dislodge  the  defenders  from  their  position,  but,  if  prac- 
ticable, to  put  them  to  rout.  If  they  are  merely  dis- 
lodged, they  will  take  up  another  defensive  position,  and 
so  prolong  to  a  considerable  extent,  by  moving  from  one 
position  to  another,  the  time  necessary  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  mission  of  the  invaders,  and  would  also 
wear  out  the  attacking  force.  The  necessity,  therefore,  of 
complete  annihilation  of  the  defenders,  as  was  the  case  at 
Santiago,  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 

Time  is  a  most  essentail  factor  in  operations  of  this 
kind,  for  every  hour's  delay  means  a  strengthening  of  the 
means  of  defense  and  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  dif- 
ficulties i(n  the  way  of  a  successful  attack.  This  explains 
the  use  made  at  Santiago  of  frontal  attacks  upon  the  in- 
trenched positions  of  the  Spaniards,  instead  of  the  more 
deliberate,  but  less  costly,  enveloping  attack.  This  also 
emphasizes  the  necessity  for  the  attacking  force  to  greatly 
outnumber  the  defenders. 

In  the  attack  upon  the  Spanish  blockhouse  at  El 
Caney,  there  were  6,653  American  troops  engaged  against 
only  520  Spaniards,  and  in  taking  the  position  we  suffered 
a  loss  of  441.*  At  San  Juan  Hill  the  American  strength 
was  8,412  and  the  Spanish  only  1,197,  while  our  losses 
aggregated  1,093  in  killed    and    wounded,  t     While  our 

♦"Campaign  of  Santiago,"  Sargent,  Vol.  II.,  p.  107, 
Ubid.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  130. 


52   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

losses  were  nearly  as  great  as  the  entire  force  of  the 
enemy,  they  were  justified  by  the  accomplishment  of  the 
mission  in  the  capture  of  the  city,  the  forcing  out  of  the 
harbor  of  Cervera^s  fleet,  and  the  surrender  of  the  forti- 
fications. A  delay  which  would  have  permitted  the 
strengthening  of  the  Spanish  position  and  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements  might  have  proved  fatal  to  the  American 
attack. 

Having  located  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched  position, 
it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  invading 
force  to  cause  the  most  careful  and  accurate  reconnais- 
sance to  be  made.  He  would  then  make  his  attack,  based 
upon  the  information  as  to  strength  and  disposition  thus 
obtained. 

EnveivOping  Attack. 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  the  form  of  attack  that  would 
promise 'the  best  results  would  be  an  enveloping  attack; 
that  is  to  say,  an  attack  on  the  defenders*  front  and  at 
least  one  of  his  flanks  simultaneously.  Assuming  this 
attack  to  have  been  successful,  it  would  be  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  the  attackers  to  tm-n  defeat  into  rout. 

The  advance  upon  Forts  Worden  and  Flagler  would 
be  resumed  immediately.  Should  the  defendeers  take  up 
other  defensive  positions,  a  similar  course  of  action  would 
be  pursued. 

Attack  on  Land  Front  of  Forts. 

Let  us  assume  that  the  invaders  have  reached  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  Port  Townsend.  The  coast  guard 
has  been  utterly  defeated,  and  the  units  that  have  not 
surrendered  have  been  put  to  rout.  There  is  nothing  now 
to  prevent  the  final  accomplishment  of  the  object  of  the 


ATTACK   AND   DEFENSE   OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        53 

campaign  but  the  actual  defenses  of  the  land  front  of  the 
fort  itself. 

These  defenders  are  known  as  "coast  artillery  sup- 
ports." They  will  have  established  themselves  in 
trenches  and  redoubts.  While  the  bulk  of  this  force  is 
composed  of  infantry,  there  will  be  siege,  field,  and  ma- 
chine guns  behind  ample  protection  and,  as  a  general  rule, 
concealed.  While  the  troops  defending  the  land  fronts 
of  the  forts  are  relatively  few  in  number,  they  will  be  so 
placed  as  to  command  the  approaches  and  render  a  suc- 
cessful assault  extremely  difficult  and  costly. 

Siege  Operations. 

Two  methods  are  open  to  the  invader.  The  first  is 
the  possibility  of  dislodgement  by  assault  following  a  heavy 
artillery  fire,  and  the  second  is  the  operation  known  as 
** sapping  and  mining."  The  former  is  costly,  while  the 
latter  is  slow  and  tedious,  involving  the  forming  of  a  cor- 
don entirely  around  the  land  front  of  the  fort  and  the 
advancing  of  the  intrenched  lines  by  regular  stages. 

The  work  of  constructing  intrenchments  is  done,  as 
far  as  possible,  under  cover  of  darkness.  The  trenches 
that  front  toward  the  fort  are  known  as  "parallels."  A 
succession  of  parallels  are  connected  by  zigzag  trenches, 
known  as  "approaches,"  so  that  troops  passing  from  one 
to  another  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
except  for  brief  spaces  of  time. 

Finally,  when  the  line  has  come  close  enough  to  the 
defenders'  position  to  warrant  mining  operations,  trenches 
and  galleries  are  run  out  directly  to  the  front,  the  workmen 
being  protected  by  saps  and  other  forms  of  head  cover. 

The  galleries  themselves  are  underground  passages, 
running  directly  towards  the  enemy  and  terminating  in 


54       ATTACK  AND   DHlP'^NS^   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

mine  chambers.  These  are  subsequently  filled  with  ex- 
plosives. If  the  defenders  gain  information  as  to  the 
means  employed  by  the  attackers,  it  is  more  than  likely 
that  they  will  institute  counter-mining  operations,  with  a 
view  to  meeting  and  destroying  the  work  of  the  attackers. 

Assuming,  however,  that  the  invading  force  was  suc- 
cessful in  its  operations,  with  the  mines  all  placed,  the 
attack  would  be  made  by  exploding  all  the  mines  simul- 
taneously. In  the  now  obsolete  stone  fort  the  object 
was  to  make  a  practicable  breach  in  the  walls.  Nowa- 
days, with  earthworks,  the  idea  rather  would  be  to  create 
as  much  destruction  in  the  redoubts  and  trenches  as 
possible,  as  well  as  demoralization  among  the  personnel 
of  the  defenders. 

The  discharge  of  mines  would  be  preceded  by  a  heavy 
artillery  and  infantry  fire  from  the  innermost  parallels, 
and  immediately  upon  the  explosion  of  the  mines  an 
assault  would  be  made  all  along  the  line. 

Admitting  that  the  attack  was  successful,  the  fate  of 
Fort  Worden  would  be  settled,  for  it  must  be  remembered 
that  artillerymen  are  trained  to  depend  on  their  guns  as 
their  weapons  of  defense  and  to  stick  to  those  guns  to  the 
last  moment.  Thus  they  are  not  able  to  personally  de- 
fend themselves  agkinst  an  assault  of  this  kind  from  the 
rear.  They  rely  on  the  coast  artillery  supports  for  such 
protectioh.  These,  together  with  the  coast  guard,  we 
have  conceded  to  have  been  defeated,  for  the  sake  of 
argument. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  FoRT  BEFORE  SURRENDER. 

It  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  however,  that  before  sur- 
rendering the  fort  every  possible  effort  would  be  made  to 
destroy  or  render  unserviceable  the  guns  and  all  their 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.   55 

accessories.  It  would  naturally  he  desirable ^  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  attacking  commander y  to  seize  these  guns  intact, 
because  Warden  is  but  one  of  the  forts  established  in  that 
vicinity  for  the  protection  of  Puget  Sound,  With  its  guns 
and  mortars  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  y  they  could  be  utilized 
to  considerable  advantage  in  bombarding  the  other  forts. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  how  important  it  is  to  destroy 
the  guns  when  they  are  no  longer  capable  of  being  used 
in  American  defense.  This  would  be  accomplished  sim- 
ply by  discharging  a  gun  with  the  breechblock  only 
partly  closed,  which  would  result  in  irreparable  wrecking 
of  the  breech  mechanism.  In  the  case  of  mortars,  two 
would  be  loaded  and  trained  upon  each  other,  muzzles 
together.  The  concussion  would  completely  wreck  both 
mortars  and  probably  everything  else  for  a  considerable 
distance  about. 

One  does  not  like  to  contemplate  the  surrender  of  an 
American  fort  or  American  troops,  and  it  is  not  believed 
for  a  moment  that  an  attack  such  as  described  would  be 
successful;  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  this 
chapter  we  are  considering  the  question  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  invading  force. 

The  natural  advantages  lie  primarily  with  the  de- 
fenders, as  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter. 


56   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 


CHAPTER  V. 


Def^nsiS  Against  a  Combined  Land  and  Navai^  Attack. 


C1.ASS1FICAT10N  OF  Defending  Troops. 

The  troops  actually  engaged  in  the  repelling  of  an 
invader  are  divided  into  three  classes.  Coast  artillery- 
men man  the  guns,  mortars,  submarine  mines,  and  the 
various  accessories  of  the  fixed  defenses.  The  coast  ar- 
tillery supports  are  the  troops,  usually  few  in  number, 
which  guard  the  land  defenses  of  the  fortifications  them- 
selves. Then  there  is  a  large  body  of  troops  (the  size 
depending  upon  local  conditions),  known  as  the  ''coast 
guard,"  maintained  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the 
landing  of  the  invader,  if  practicable,  or  in  any  event 
preventing  his  approach  to  attack  the  land  fronts  of 
the  forts. 

Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

The  coast  artillery  troops  would  comprise  a  sufficient 
strength  to  man  all  the  elements  of  the  fixed  defense. 
Their  number  would  depend  on  the  requirements  of  the 
particular  fort  under  attack,  and  would  comprise  both 
regular  coast  artillery  troops  and  coast  artillery  militia. 

Coast  Artillery  Supports. 
The  coast  artillery  supports  would,  in  general,  be 
composed  of  infantry,  with  perhaps  a  few  coast  artillery- 
men to  handle  siege  and  field  guns,  emplaced  semiper- 
manently. The  number  of  these  troops  would  be  rela- 
tively small — for  instance,  not  exceeding  one  regiment 


ATTACK  AND   DEJI^^NSE)   OI^  IfORTllM^D  HARBORS.       57 

for  the  entire  coast  defenses  of  Puget  Sound.  A  battalion 
probably  would  be  assigned  to  the  land  side  of  each  of 
Forts  Worden,  Flagler,  and  Casey. 

Coast  Guard. 
The  strength  of  the  coast  guard  also  would  depend 
upon  local  conditions.  It  might  be  said,  as  a  general 
rule,  that  if  the  particular  point  is  worth  defending,  and 
therefore  liable  to  concerted  attack,  the  smallest  force 
that  could,  with  any  degree  of  safety,  be  considered  for 
coast  guard  duty  would  be  a  brigade  of  infantry,  together 
with  some  field  artillery  and  cavalry.  In  all  probability 
the  force  for  the  more  important  points  would  be  a 
division. 

DETERMINATION  OI^  InVADER. 

We  have  already  seen  that  a  combined  land  and  naval 
attack  is  the  only  kind  of  an  attack  that  promises  any 
degree  of  success,  and  therefore,  if  undertaken,  will  be 
pressed  with  vigor. 

The  intention  of  the  enemy  probably  will  be  de- 
termined very  soon  after  he  begins  his  operations.  Thus 
it  should  be  known  by  the  coast  defense  commander  that 
the  bombardment  is  simply  for  the  purpose  of  engaging 
the  batteries  and  the  personnel  while  attack  is  made  by 
the  landing  forces. 

He  therefore  will  not  waste  an  undue  amount  of  am- 
munition in  a  more  or  less  ineffective  long-range  fire. 
The  mortars  being  especially  effective  at  the  longer 
ranges,  an  effort  would  be  made  to  disable  the  ships  of 
the  enemy  by  their  fire.  The  gun  batteries  will  fire  only 
at  rather  long  intervals,  probably  several  mihutes  elkpsing 
between  shots ;  the  idea  being  to  keep  the  fleet  from  at- 
tempting some  other  means  of  attack  that  might  result 


58       ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

from  the  exhaustion  of  ammunition  or  a  fancied  sup- 
pression of  the  fire  of  the  shore  batteries. 

In  other  words,  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  coast 
defense  commander  to  keep  the  commander  of  the  at- 
tacking fleet  thoroughly  informed  that  he  is  alive  and 
amply  able  to  defend  himself  all  the  time,  without  wast- 
ing his  ammunition. 

KNOWI.KDGE  OF  THE  COUNTRY. 

In  time  of  peace  the  country  surrounding  the  vari- 
ous coast  defenses  for  a  very  considerable  distance  is 
thoroughly  and  accurately  mapped,  so  that  all  its  topo- 
graphical features  are  a  matter  of  record. 

Officers  stationed  at  the  various  coast  defenses  are 
encouraged  to  familiarize  themselves  thoroughly  with  the 
country  by  riding,  walking,  or  motoring  over  it,  so  that 
they  know  individually  and  by  practical  observation 
everything  concerning  its  character. 

In  addition,  a  portion  of  the  instruction  each  year  is 
devoted  to  problems  of  attack  and  defense  in  that  part  of 
the  country  which  naturally  would  be  the  theater  of  op- 
erations for  the  coast  guard  and  invaders  in  time  of  war. 
In  this  way  practical  problems  are  worked  out,  having 
the  effect  of  familiarizing  both  officers  and  men  with  what 
might  reasonably  and  logically  be  expected  to  be  the 
conditions  in  time  of  war. 

Assuming  that  war  has  been  declared,  and  the  troops 
constituting  the  coast  guard  have  been  mobilized,  with 
headquarters  say  at  Port  Townsend,  the  first  duty  of  the 
general  in  command  would  be,  by  means  of  reconnais- 
sances, to  famiUarize  himself  personally  with  the  country- 
he  is  required  to  defend.  He  would  then  dispose  his 
troops,  following  plans  which  have  been  formulated  in 


ATTACK  AND   DKB'^NSH   OF   FORTIFIED   HARBORS.        59 

time  of  peace,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  provide  both  a 
ready  and  accurate  service  of  information  and  the  means 
of  arresting  the  progress  of  an  invading  force. 

NECESSITY  OF  PREV:eNTlNG  A  LANDING. 

In  the  event  of  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack, 
the  first  duty  of  the  coast  guard  would  be  to  prevent  a 
landing.  In  the  Santiago  campaign  the  Spaniards  made 
their  first  serious  blunder  in  not  having  contested  the 
landing,  as  did  the  Turks  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula. 
The  information  as  to  the  movements  of  the  fleet  being 
communicated  to  him,  it  would  be  the  endeavor  of  the 
coast  guard  commander  to  concentrate  all  his  forces  at 
the  threatened  point  of  attack. 

As  has  been  already  noted,  the  very  best  possible  line 
of  defense  is  a  shore-line.  No  protection  is  afforded  troops 
in  small  boats,  whereas  all  possible  protection  can  be  af- 
forded to  troops  stationed  on  or  near  the  shore -line.  It  is 
therefore  of  the  greatest  possible  importance  that  the  de- 
fending commander  prevent  an  actual  landing.  Realiz- 
ing this,  the  commander  of  the  invading  troops  will  en- 
deavor to  outwit  the  coast  guard  by  making  a  feint  at  one 
point  and  landing  the  bulk  of  his  force  at  another. 

Defensive;  Action,  with  Counter- Attacks. 

At  any  rate,  we  will  assume  that  such  a  landing  has 
been  effected.  The  commander  of  the  coast  guard,  having 
received  information  to  this  effect,  will  dispose  his  forces 
in  a  good  defensive  position  (of  which  there  are  many  on 
the  Olympic  Peninsula) ,  but  will  not  confine  himself  to  a 
passive  defense. 

It  may  be  stated  as  one  of  the  fundamental  principles 
of  strategy,  that  decisive  results  never  are  accomplished  on  the 


6o       ATTACK  AND  D^FJ^NSlS   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

defensive.  Thus,  while  the  conditions  governing  the  op- 
erations of  the  coast  guard  make  it  absolutely  essential 
that  strong  defensive  positions  should  be  selected  and  oc- 
cupied, yet  an  active  and  energetic  commander,  who 
thoroughly  appreciates  the  functions  of  his  office,  never 
wo\ild  be  content  to  remain  passive  behind  breastworks. 

A  glaring  instance  of  the  failure  to  take  advantage  of 
one*s  opportunities  is  to  be  found  in  the  action  of  General 
Toral  at  Santiago.  At  the  time  General  Shafter's  army 
landed  on  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba  there  were  in  the 
Province  of  Santiago  36,582*  Spanish  soldiers  and  about 
1,000  marines,  who  were  disembarked  from  Cervera's 
fleet;  and  yet  apparently  no  effort  was  made  to  prevent 
the  landing  of  the  American  forces.  When  Shafter  un- 
dertook the  attack  with  his  small  army  corps  of  only 
i7,349t  officers  and  men,  there  were  actually  opposed  to 
him  in  the  trenches  of  San  Juan  and  the  blockhouse  at  El 
Caney  only  1,717+ Spanish  troops.  Thus  less  than  one - 
twentieth  of  the  available  Spanish  force  was  utilized  in 
its  proper  function  as  a  coast  guard.  Very  naturally,  the 
invader  gained  the  result  of  his  mission. 

It  may  therefore  be  laid  down  as  a  principle  that,  while 
acting  generally  on  the  defensive y  the  commander  of  the  coast 
guard  must  he  ready  to  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity 
for  an  effective  counter-attack  that  may  defeat  the  purposes 
of^  the  invader  and  drive  him  hack  into  the  sea. 

FiNAi.  DEFENSIVE  Position. 

Let  us  assume  that  the  invader  has  succeeded  in  get- 
ting around  the  head  of  Port  Discovery  Bay,  and  has 

♦"Campaign  of  Santiago,"  Sargent,  Vol.  I.,  p.  102. 

t/6id.,  Vol.  III.,  p.  217. 

%Ibid.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  130,  foot-note. 


ATTACK  AND  D^F^NS^   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       6 1 

begun  a  march  north  on  the  Quimper  Peninsula.     The  v 

coast  guard  would  have  fallen  back  and  taken  up  its  final 
defensive  position  at  a  point  probably  in  the  vicinity  of 
Chimacum.  Here  the  ground  is  thickly  covered  with  the 
densest  of  undergrowth,  making  a  veritable  jungle.  The 
roads  and  trails  are  few,  but  well  defined,  and  natural  de- 
fensive positions  exist  in  large  numbers.  The  possibility 
of  the  enemy  being  able  to  force  these  positions  is  decidedly 
remote. 

One  of  the  essential  requirements  of  a  good  defensive 
position  is  that  its  flanks  rest  on  impassable  objects.  Here 
these  objects  are  Port  Discovery  Bay  on  the  west  and 
Port  Townsend  Bay  on  the  east.  Another  requirement  is  a 
clear  field  of  fire  to  the  front.  Such  a  field  would  be  pro- 
vided during  the  period  of  waiting  by  cutting  down  the 
trees  and  undergrowth  to  a  sufficient  distance  in  front  of 
the  selected  position,  so  that  the  enemy  would  be  required 
to  approach  over  open  ground  that  could  be  easily  fire- 
swept. 

The  woods  being  impassable  to  large  bodies  of  troops, 
or  even  patrols,  the  enemy  would  be  forced  to  advance  in 
columns  along  the  roads,  where  relatively  small  bodies  of 
the  defenders  c6uld  hold  him  in  check  and  throw  him  into 
confusion.  Thus  it  may  be  said  that  of  the  problems 
involved  in  the  attack  and  defense  of  Forts  Worden  and 
Flagler  from  the  land  side,  all  are  naturally  favorable  to 
the  defender,  and  an  attacking  force  would  be  obliged  to 
fight  for  every  foot  of  ground  gained. 

lyAND  De;fe)nse  of  Forts. 

The  theory  of  the  land  defense  of  our  coast  forts  has 
been  considerably  modified  as  the  result  of  the  use  of 
enormous  guns  in  the  field  in  the  present  European  war. 


62   ;^TTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

Instead  of  limiting  the  artillery  of  the  landward  side  of 
the  forts  to  such  field  and  siege  guns  and  howitzers,  none 
exceeding  7 -inch  caliber,  as  are  issued  to  the  various  forts 
for  that  purpose,  it  is  now  contemplated  utilizing  the 
guns  emplaced  for  the  sieaward  defense. 

A  careful  study  of  the  entire  question  has  been  made, 
together  with  experimental  firing  by  the  mortars  of 
Fort  Mills,  Corregidor  Island,  against  the  summit  of  the 
highest  of  the  Mariveles  Hills  on  the  adjacent  mainland. 
As  a  result,  the  feasibility  of  utilizing  the  armament  in 
this  manner  has  been  very  clearly  demonstrated,  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  forts  increased  thereby  to  a  very 
great  extent. 

In  some  instances  it  will  be  necessary  to  alter  present 
gun  carriages  and  emplacements  in  order  to  provide  for 
an  all-around  fire,  but  in  many  other  instances — as,  for 
example,  in  the  coast  defenses  of  Puget  Sound — the  guns 
of  one  fort  at  the  present  time  admirably  cover  the  land 
approach  to  one  or  more  of  the  other  forts  of  the  harbor. 

This  new  use  of  the  fixed  armament  requires  the 
adoption  of  shrapnel  as  one  of  the  regular  types  of  pro- 
jectile to  be  issued  to  the  coast  artillery,  and  also  involves 
the  solution  of  the  somewhat  complex  problem  of  fire- 
direction  and  control.  In  all  probability  the  method  to 
be  adopted  will  be  an  adaptation  of  the  ''square  system, '* 
in  connection  with  lookout  stations  located  at  favorable 
points  in  the  area  covered  and  with  aeroplanes. 

While  considering  the  subject  of  the  land  defense  of 
the  forts,  a  few  words  as  to  the  functions  of  the  coast 
artillery  supports  will  be  of  interest.  Let  us  take  Fort 
Flagler  as  an  instance  of  this,  and  assume  that  the  de- 
fenders would  comprise  one  battalion  of  infantry  and  a 
few  men  taken  either  from  the  infantry  or  coast  artillery 


o 
< 

o 

H 

O 

u 
w 


o 


ATTACK  AND  DEI^ENSE)   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       63 

to  man  several  siege  and  field  guns.  These  troops  would 
be  disposed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  gain  timely  information 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and,  in  the  event  of  such 
approach,  to  repel  landing  attacks. 

The  entire  force  would  be  virtually  disposed  as  an 
outpost.  Trenches  have  been  constructed  in  time  of 
peace,  covering  all  approaches  to  the  reservation,  and 
would  readily  be  occupied  by  bodies  of  troops  of  sufficient 
strength  to  repel  any  attack.  Of  course,  until  such  time 
as  the  coast  guard  were  defeated,  no  attack  of  greater 
moment  than  a  raiding  force  could  be  expected  on  the  land 
fronts  of  any  of  the  forts,  and  it  is  against  surprises  of  this 
nature  that  the  coast  artillery  supports  are  provided. 
The  work  is  essentially  one  of  security  and  information. 

The  pickets  and  out-guards  must  be  constantly  on 
the  alert  and  ready  to  give  warning  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy,  while  patrols  undoubtedly  would  be  sent  out  on 
both  Marrowstone  and  Indian  Islands  for  the  same 
purpose. 

Word  of  the  enemy's  approach  having  been  received, 
the  troops  held  in  reserve  would  be  rushed  immediately 
to  occupy  the  tranches  at  the  threatened  point  of  attack. 
In  the  improbable  event  of  the  defeat  and  rout  of  the  coast 
guard,  the  supports  would  constitute  the  last  element  of 
defense  on  the  land  fronts  of  the  forts,  and  would  be  held 
constantly  in  the  trenches.  Should  siege  operations  be 
undertaken  by  the  invader,  the  defense  would  resort  to 
counter-mining  operations,  as  explained  in  Chapter  IV. 

It  was  stated  in  Chapter  I.  that  our  coast  defenses 
are  ample  on  the  sea  front,  but  weak  on  the  land  side, 
which  in  general  is  true;  yet  with  the  increasing  range  and 
caliber  of  naval  guns,  modifications  in  our  present  carriages 
to  provide  for  firing  at  higher  elevations  and  larger  guns 


64       ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

are  essential  for  effective  long-range  work.  With  refer- 
ence to  the  general  weakness  of  the  land  fronts,  the  coast 
defenses  of  Puget  Sound  are  to  some  extent  an  exception, 
due  to  the  characteristics  of  the  country  surrounding  the 
forts,  providing  very  considerable  natural  advantages  to 
the  defense,  and,  as  already  stated,  an  invader  would  have 
the  greatest  difficulty  in  making  an  advance. 

Troops  to  Form  Supports  and  Coast  Guard. 

One  vital  point  remains  to  be  considered,  and  that  is, 
Where  ^re  we  going  to  obtain  an  adequate  force,  even  as 
small  as  a  brigade,  for  assignment  to  duty  as  coast  guard 
for  the  Olympic  Peninsula  immediately  on  the  outbreak 
of  war? 

The  military  policy  of  the  nation  is  almost  a  negative 
quantity.  Our  Army  is  vastly  below  the  requirements 
even  of  peace  service.  On  the  outbreak  of  war  large  con- 
centration camps  would  be  established.  Brigades  and  di- 
visions of  the  regular  Army  and  Organized  Militia  would 
be  mobilized  and  the  larger  units  organized,  while  the  or- 
ganization and  training  of  the  second  line  {t.  e,y  the  vol- 
unteers) would  be  undertaken  immediately.  But  while 
this  work  would  be  going  on,  the  coast  guard  would  be 
required  in  the  vicinity  of  every  fortified  harbor.  It  is  a 
serious  question  as  to  whether  sufficient  troops  would  be 
immediately  available  both  for  the  general  mobilization 
referred  to  and  the  most  important  functions  that  devolve 
upon  the  coast  guard. 

It  might  be  said  that  the  War  Departpient  now  has 
under  consideration  the  establishment  of  a  brigade  post 
on  Puget  Sound.  This  is  a  logical  and  very  necessary 
consideration.  If  such  a  post  were  established,  the  troops 
for  the  coast  guard  would  be  here  and  diuring  time  of  peace 


ATTACK  AND   D^I^^NSE   OI^  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       65 

would  be  able  to  familiarize  themselves  thoroughly  with 
the  theater  in  which  they  would  operate  in  time  of  war, 
and  at  the  same  time  would  be  available  for  duty  elsewhere 
after  the  danger  of  invasion  of  the  Puget  Sound  country 
had  passed.  In  the  report  of  the  Army  War  College  on 
the  subject  of  an  adequate  military  policy,  recently  made 
public,  Puget  Sound  is  classed  as  one  of  the  **critical'^ 
localities,  and  the  recommendation  made  that  a  division 
be  permanently  stationed  there. 

National  Guard  Ini^antry. 

A  very  reasonable  source  of  the  supply  of  the  troops 
required  for  coast  guard  and  coast  artillery  support  duty 
would  be  the  mobile  forces  of  the  National  Guard  of  ad- 
jacent States.  There  is  a  feeling  of  especial  satisfaction 
on  the  part  of  the  citizen-soldier  when  he  knows  that  his 
function  in  time  of  war  will  not  only  be  national  defense, 
but  the  actual  defense  of  his  own  State  and  city  against 
invasion.  In  the  case  of  the  defenses  of  Puget  Sound,  the 
coast  artillery  militia  of  the  State  of  Washington  will  be 
assigned  to  batteries  which  will  defend  the  approach  to 
their  own  homes,  and  it  is  eminently  fitting  that  troops  of 
the  mobile  forces  of  the  same  State  should  be  similarly 
assigned  to  the  land  defenses  of  the  forts. 

But  here  again  a  deficiency  is  at  once  apparent.  At 
least  a  regiment  of  infantry  is  required  for  coast  artillery 
support  duty,  and  at  least  a  brigade,  with  some  cavalry, 
field  artillery,  and  signal  troops,  if  not  a  division,  for  coast 
guard  duty.  To  supply  this  need,  the  State  of  Wash- 
ington is  able  to  provide  but  one  regiment  of  infantry,  a 
single  troop  of  cavalry,  and  a  single  field  company  of 
signal  troops. 

The  pressing  demand  for  an  adequate  force  of  trained 


66       ATTACK  AND   D^FKNS^  O^  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

troops  on  the  outbreak  of  war  for  this  most  important 
duty  would  seem  to  indicate  the  great  desirability  for  the 
State  of  Washington  to  maintain  as  its  minimum  force 
a  brigade  of  infantry,  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  a  battalion 
of  field  artillery,  a  field  company  of  signal  troops,  and 
foiu*teen  companies  of  coast  artillery. 


ATTACK  AND   DJ^F^NS^   OF  FORTlFi:eD   HARBORS.       67 


APPENDIX  A. 


Attack  and  Dbfknsjs  of  Fortified  Harbors. 


Correspondence  Course, 


I.ESSON  I. 

(Chapter  I.) 

Generai,  Principi<es  of  Coast  Defense. 

1 .  (a)    Into  what  two  classes  are  permanent  fortifica- 

tions divided? 

(6)    Which  of  these  classes  is  made  use  of  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  in  Europe? 

(c)    Which  in  this  country? 

2.  (a)    Define  **  coast  defense." 

(6)    What  points   of  a  coast-line  are  selected  to  be 
defended? 

3.  (a)    Name  five  principal  defended  harbors   on  the 

Atlantic  Coast. 
(6)   Two  on  the  Gulf  Coast. 
{c)    All  on  the  Pacific  Coast. 
{d)   All  beyond  the  continental  limits  of  the  United 

States. 

4.  What  is  the  ideal  location  of  a  coast  defense  fortifi- 

cation, and  why? 

5.  (a)   Name  the  two  general  classes  of  attack  against 

coast  fortifications. 
{Jj)   Subdivide  naval  attacks. 


68       ATTACK  AND   DKl^KNS^   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

6.  Give  some  pertinent  reasons  why  a  **run  past" 

would  probably  not  be  undertaken. 

7.  What  is  the  only  form  of  attack  that  will  promise 

any  degree  of  success  ? 

8.  (a)    Make  a  rough  sketch  showing  the  location  of 

the  forts  constituting  the  coast  defenses  of  Pu- 
get  Sound. 

(b)  State  why  Fort  Flagler  possesses  certain  advan- 
tages in  the  matter  of  land  defense  over  the 
other  forts. 

9.  Suppose  Forts  Worden  and  Casey  should  be  reduced 

or  captured,  what  would  be  the  problem  that  still 
confronted  the  invader? 

10.  Discuss  fully  the  military  importance  of  the  coast 

defenses  of  Puget  Sound  in  time  of  war  with  a 
naval  power  operating  in  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

LESSON  II. 
(Chapter  II.) 

Navai^  Attack. 

11.  Name  the  different  forms  of  attack  or  operations 

which  might  be  undertaken  by  the  invader. 

12.  In  the  unlikely  event  of  a  "run  past,"  tell  how  this 

might  be  accomplished,  stating  advantages  and 
difficulties  to  be  encountered. 

13.  (a)    What  is  a  blockade? 

(6)  What  disposition  of  his  forces  would  the  in- 
vading admiral  make  to  render  a  blockade 
effective? 


.      ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE)   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       69 

14.  (a)    What  is  a  bombardment? 

(6)    Why  is  a  bombardment  usually  ineffective? 
(c)    Quote  an  historical  example. 

15.  What  is  meant  by  a  ** reconnaissance  in  force" ? 

16.  What  would  be  the  probable  form  of  attack? 

17.  What  part  of  the  defenses  would  be  most  likely  to 

suffer  from  a  bombardment? 

18.  For  what  purposes  are  battleships  primarily  built? 

19.  What  is  the  only  form  of  attack  that  promises  any 

degree  of  success  ? 

20.  Discuss  the  risk  involved  to  armored  ships  in  sub- 

jecting them  to  the  fire  of  coast  fortifications. 

LESSON  III. 

(Chaj)ter  III.) 

Defense  Against  Navai^  Attack. 

21.  What  are  the  general  classifications  of  the  elements 

of  coast  defense? 

22.  How  would  you  further  classify  artillery  defenses? 

(a)  With  reference  to  the  type  of  weapon. 

(b)  With  reference  to  caliber  and  use. 

23.  (a)   What  is  the  tactical  use  of  guns? 

(b)    What  is  the  tactical  use  and  what  are  the  ad- 
vantages of  mortars  ? 

24.  Name  th^  calibers  that  pertain  to  each  of  the  major, 

intermediate,  and  minor  armaments. 

25.  What  is  the  present-day  tendency  as  regards  the 

number  of  different  calibers? 

26.  What  are  the  functions  of  guns  of  the  intermediate 

and  minor  armament? 


70       ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE   OP  FORTlJflED  HARBORS.      • 

27.  (a)    How  would  you  subdivide  the  means  for  sub- 

marine defense? 
(6)    What  are  the  functions  of  submarine  boats,  and 

under  whose  command  do  they  operate? 
(c)    Discuss  aerial  defense. 

28.  Name  some  of  the  auxiliary  elements  of  the  coast 

defense. 

29.  What  are  general  defense  plans  and  their  uses? 

30.  Discuss  the  function  of  our  fleet  in  connection  with 

coast  defense. 

LESSON  IV. 

(Chapter  IV.) 

Combined  Land  and  Navai,  Attack. 

31.  Assuming  that  the  invader  intends  making  a  com- 

bined land  and  naval  attack,  what  would  be  the 
first  step? 

32.  Discuss  the  landing  of  troops. 

33.  Assuming  that  a  landing  has  been  effected,  how 

would  the  invading  force  proceed? 

34.  Upon  meeting  with  the  coast  guard,  what  would  be 

the  intention  of  the  commander  of  the  inva4ing 
force? 

35.  What  kind  of  an  attack  promises  the  most  decisive 

results? 

36.  Supposing  all  attacks  have  been  successful,  and  the 

invader  finds  himself  in  front  of  the  land  front  of 
the  fort,  what  means  are  open  to  him  to  cause  the 
reduction,  the  surrender,  or  the  evacuation,  of 
the  fort? 


ATTACK  AND   D:^FKNSE   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.       7 1 

37.  Discuss  briefly   the   question   of  siege  operations, 

making  a  sketch  giving  your  idea  of  ** parallels'* 
and  "approaches.** 

38.  What  is  meant  by  "mining  operations**  in  land  war- 

fare, and  how  are  they  combated? 

39.  What  is  the  duty  of  the  defenders  as  a  last  resort 

before  surrender  or  evacuation? 

40.  How  would  you  destroy  a  gun  or  a  mortar? 

LESSON  V, 
(Chapter  V,) 

D^F^NS^  Against  a  Combined  Land  and  Naval  Attack, 

41.  Classify  the  defending  troops. 

42.  To  which  classification  does  the  coast  artillery  mil- 

itia pertain? 

43.  What  will  be  the  aim  of  the  coast  guard  commander 

when  he  has  determined  that  the  enemy  have  un- 
dertaken a  combined  land  and  naval  attack? 

44.  What  will  be  the  aim  of  the  coast  defense  com- 

mander under  the  same  conditions? 

45.  What  can  you  say  of  the  necessity  for  preventing  a 

landing? 

46.  What  is  the  strategical  principle  concerning  defensive 

actions? 

47.  Discuss  the  value  of  aggressive  counter-attacks. 

48.  Discuss  the  occupation  of  the  final  defensive  po- 

sition. 

49.  What  disposition  is  made   of  the  coast   artillery 

supports? 


72       ATTACK  AND   Dl^F^NS^   OF  FORTIFIED   HARBORS. 

50.  In  your  opinion,  where  would  troops  best  be  ob- 
tained for  coast  guard  and  support  duty  in  con- 
nection with  coast  defenses  of  Puget  Sound  upon 
the  outbreak  of  war? 


ATTACK  AND   D^FEJNSH   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS.        73 

APPENDIX  B. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


*'An  Ex-Confederate*s  Views  of  National  Defense/' 
By  "Colonel  Martin"  (Vestal);  Journal  of  the  United 
States  Artillery. 

'*  Attack  and  Defense  of  Coast  Fortifications."  By 
Maguire. 

''Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors."  By 
Hall;  Journal  of  the  United  States  Artillery, 

"Attack  of  Fortified  Places."     By  Mercur. 

"Attacks  Upon  Fortified  Harbors. ''  Journal  of  the 
United  States  Artillery, 

"Campaign  of  Santiago."     By  Sargent. 

* '  Coast  Defense  in  the  Civil  War. ' '  By  Buttgenbach ; 
Journal  of  the  United  States  Artillery. 

Coast  Artillery  Drill  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army. 

Coast  Artillery  War  Game.     By  Chamberlaine. 

"Fighting  Ships."     By  Jane. 

"  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  History."     By  Mahan. 

"  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power."     By  Mahan. 

' '  Land  Defenses. ' '     By  Fiebeger. 

"Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain."     By  Mahan. 

Manual  of  Field  Engineering.     By  Beach. 

"The  Selection  and  Defense  of  Naval  Bases."  By 
Vestal;  Journal  of  the  United  States  Artillery. 

"Service  of  Coast  Artillery."     By  Hines  and  Ward. 

"Study  in  the  Attack  of  Fortified  Harbors."  By 
Rodgers ;  Proceedings  of  the  United  States  Naval  Institute 
and  Artillery  Notes,  No.  28. 

"Tactics  of  Coast  Defense."     By  Wisser. 

Text-Book  of  Field  Fortification.     By  Fiebeger. 


APPENDIX  C. 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  OF  FORTIFIED 
HARBORS, 

BY 

CAPTAIN  ARTHUR  P.  S.  HYDE 

Coast  Artillery  Corps. 


SERIES  OP  BOOK  REVIEWS. 

The  articles  of  Captain  Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde,  C.  A., 
U.  S.  A.,  contributed  in  a  series  to  the  Seattle  (Wash.) 
Daily  Times  at  the  request  of  Colonel  William  E.  McClure, 
commanding  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps  of  Washington, 
have  been  published  in  pamphlet  form  under  the  title, 
**  Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors."  Captain 
Hyde  is  the  inspector-instructor  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
Reserves  of  Washington,  and  his  pamphlet  is  now  pub- 
lished by  the  headquarters  c>f  the  Reserve  Corps  at  Se- 
attle. The  geheral  subjects  treated  are  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  coast  defense,  naval  attack,  defense  against  naval 
attack,  combined  land  and  naval  attack,  and  defense 
against  combined  land  and  naval  attack. 

The  author  is  satisfied  with  the  coast  defenses  of  the 
coimtry ,  for  he  says :  * '  We  are  exceptionally  well  defeased^ 
so  far  as  the  sea  fronts  are  concerned;  so  well,  in  fact,  that 
we  may  safely  say  it  would  be  impossible  for  our  forts  either 
to  be  reduced  by  bombardment  by  a  hostile  fleet  or  ren- 
dered untenable,  owing  to  attack  by  sea  alone. ' '  However, 
he  finds  that  "little  or  northing  has  been  done  in  the  way 
of  providing  land  defenses  for  our  forts.'* 

75 


76       ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIE^D   HARBORS. 

Relative  to  the  efficacy  of  bombardment,  the  au- 
thor says :  "Vessels  may  lie  at  nearly  extreme  range  and 
bombard  the  forts,  with  a  view  to  disabling  guns  and 
fire-control  stations  and  to  produce  such  demoralization 
among  the  personnel  as  may  be  possible.  This  method 
never  produces  decisive  results.*' 

The  "run  past"  form  of  attack,  such  as  that  which 
made  Admiral  Farragut  prominent,  is  not  feasible  to-day, 
on  account  of  the  large  cost  of  a  modern  battleship  and 
the  small  return  derivable  in  comparison  with  the  loss  of 
a  big  ship.  Although  the  only  guns  less  than  a  hundred 
years  old  defending  the  harbor  of  Santiago,  Cuba,  were 
four  or  five  small- caliber  pieces,  dismounted  from  the 
disused  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes y  and  mounted  near  Morro 
Castle,  Admiral  Sampson  did  not  care  to  subject  his  ar- 
mored ships  to  the  fire  of  these  guns  while  the  Spanish 
fleet  was  still  afloat.  "  Every  armored  ship  needlessly  lost 
in  war  is  virtually  a  gain  of  two  for  the  enemy." 

The  latest  and  best  thought  in  the  matter  of  coast 
defense  involves,  wherever  practicable,  the  location  of 
forts  on  small  isUands,  as  offering  no  chance  for  land 
attack.  The  defenses  of  Manila  Bay  show  the  greatest 
development  of  this  idea.  The  splendid  location  of  Fort 
Flagler  on  Marrowstone  Island  has  convinced  a  number 
of  officers  that  all  the  defenses  of  Puget  Sound  should  be 
concentrated  at  Flagler.  "  Unsupported  by  a  land  attack, 
a  naval  bombardment  should  not  be  relied  on  to  effect 
the  reduction,  siurrender,  or  evacuation  of  a  fort." 

•  The  opinion  of  the  author  is  that,  as  battleships  are 
built  to  fight  battleships,  they  are  not  the  match  of  ade- 
quate coast  defenses,  and  that  th^e  only  form  of  attack 
promising  success  against  coast  defenses  is  a  combined 
land  and  naval  one.     In  defensive  work,  the  mortar  and 


ATTACK  AND   D^Pi'^NS^   OF   FORTII^IBD   HARBORS.        77 

the  submarine  promise  the  best  results  against  battle- 
ships, as  the  velocity  of  a  mortar  projectile  is  increasing 
at  the  moment  of  impact,  and  the  longer  the  range  the 
greater  the  velocity,  while  with  direct-fire  guns  the  ve- 
locity of  the  projectile  is  decreasing  from  the  moment  it 
leaves  the  muzzle.  Again,  the  mortar  seeks  out  the 
lightest  armor  protection  of  ships,*  the  decks,  while  the 
direct  fire  aims  at  the  heavily  protected  slides.  From  the 
present  tendency  toward  reduction  in  the  number  of  dif- 
ferent calibers  manifest  in  the  Navy  and  in  coast  defetise. 
Captain  Hyde  draws  the  conclusion  that  in  new  fortifica- 
tions the  primary  armament  should  consist  of  either  12- 
or  14-inch  guns — depending  on  local  conditions;  the  in- 
termediate armament,  of  6-inch,  and  the  secondary  arma- 
ment, of  3 -inch.  There  seems  to  be  little,  if  any,  use  for 
7-,  8-,  and  lo-inch  guns.  The  increase  of  the  British  dread- 
naught  guns  to  1 5 -inch  and  the  success  of  the  German 
42-centimete;r  (i6>^-inch)  gun  indicate  the  necessity  of 
making  the  16-inch  gun  the  standard  maximum  caliber 
for  coast  defense. 

Attention  is  called  by  the  pamphlet  to  the  fact  that 
in  France  the  problem  of  coast  defense  is  confided  to  the 
Navy.  A  great  aid  to  coast  defense  would  be  furnished 
by  submarines.  In  the  most  promising  form  of  attack, 
that  by  land  and  sea,  the  coast  guard  must  consider  its 
first  duty  to  b^  that  of  preventing  the  landing  of  the  land- 
force  of  the  enemy.  This  was  not  done  by  General  Toral 
when  Shaf ter  landed  for  the  investment  of  Cuba.  The  lat- 
ter had  only  15,000  men  approximately,  while  there  were 
36,582  Spanish  soldiers  and  1,000  sailors  landed  from 
Cervera^s  fleet  available  for  preventing  this  landing. 
The  plan  now  under  consideration  by  the  War  Department 
for  establishing  a  brigade  post  on  Puget  Sound  means 


78       ATTACK  AND   D^FENS^   OF  FORTIFIED  HARBORS. 

much  for  the  proper  defense  of  that  district.  Captain 
Hyde's  treatment  of  the  question  of  coast  defense  is 
marked  by  a  singularly  lucid  and  instructive  method  of 
dressing  up  otherwise  dryly  technical  data,  and  is  espe- 
cially valuable  for  State  coast  artillerymen. — Army  and 
Navy  Journal,  December  19,  19 14. 


Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors. 


Captain  Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde,  C.  A.  C,  inspector- 
instructor,  National  Guard  of  Washington,  upon  the  re- 
quest of  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
Reserve  Corps  of  the  State  of  Washington,  published  some 
interesting  articles  in  a  prominent  Seattle  daily,  dealing 
with  the  organization  and  functions  of  coast  artillery,  with 
particular  reference  to  the  defense  of  Puget  Sound. 

The  interest  which  theise  articles  ekcited  among  the 
officeSrs  of  the  National  Guard  of  Washington,  and  a  desire 
to  make  a  careful  study  of  the  important  subject  of  the 
attack  and  defense  of  fortified  harbors,  led  Captain  Hyde 
to  revise  the  material  and  publish  it  in  the  form  of  a  con- 
venient booklet.  As  such  it  has  been  used  as  a  basis  for 
a  correspondence  coturse. 

This  valuable  brochure  should  prove  of  great  use  to 
coast  artillery  officers  of  the  National  Guard  wherever 
they  may  be  located,  and  it  is  of  sufficient  general  interest 
to  make  it  worth  reading  by  anyone  interested  in  the 
defense  of  our  coasts. — Arms  and  the  Man,  December  24, 
1914. 


Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors 


This  is  a  small  pamphlet  of  twenty-seven  pages,  in 
which  the  author  has  covered  most  admirably,  for  its 
small  compass,  an  extensive  subject. 

The  pamphlet,  as  stated  in  the  preface,  is  a  compila- 
tion of  a  series  of  articles  written  by  the  author  at  the 
request  of  Colonel  William  E.  McClure,  commanding  the 
Coast  Artillery  Reserve  Corps  of  the  State  of  Washington, 
and  published  in  the  Seattle  Daily  Times  in  January  and 
February,  19 14.  The  pamphlet  is  published  as  Bulletin 
No.  3,  Headquarters  Coast  Artillery  Reserve  Corps,  dated 
Seattle,  Washington,  November  11,  19 14. 

The  first  chapter  deals  with  the  general  principles 
of  coast  defense.  The  necessity  for  permanent  works  and 
the  general  policy  of  the  United  States  as  to  coast  fortifica- 
tion are  set  forth.  A  list  of  the  fortified  harbors  in  the 
United  States  is  given.  The  general  forms  of  attack  to 
which  coast  fortifications  are  subject  are  given,  and  from 
a  consideration  of  these  is  deduced  the  general  principles 
governing  the  selection  of  the  most  suitable  sites  for 
coast  fortifications. 

Succeeding  chapters  discuss  the  subjects  of  naval 
attack,  the  defense  against  naval  attack,  including  the 
organization  of  the  defenses;  the  submarine  and  aerial 
defenses,  and  the  function  of  the  Navy  in  supplementing 
the  shore  defenses;  the  combined  land  and  naval  attack, 
and  the  defense  against  a  combined  attack.  At  the  end 
of  the  book  is  given  a  synopsis  of  a  correspondence  course 

80 


ATTACK  AND   DEFENSE   OF  FORTIFIED   H.\RBORS.       8 1 

in  the  subject  of  "Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Har- 
bors.*' This  course  consists  of  a  series  of  questions  cov- 
ering the  subject-matter  of  the  text. 

A  bibHography  is  also  given,  so  that  anyone  desiring 
to  make  a  more  extended  study  has  at  hand  a  Hst  of  ex- 
cellent reference-books  and  papers  treating  of  the  subject. 

Giving,  as  it  does,  the  general  principles  of  attack 
and  defense  of  coast  fortifications  in  concrete  form,  the 
pamphlet  is  of  great  value  to  the  coast  artillery  reserves 
or  to  any  person  desiring  information  on  the  coast  artillery 
branch  of  our  national  defense,  and  who  has  not  the  time 
to  give  to  an  extended  course  of  reading. 

By  Captain  Arthur  P.  S.  Hyde,  C.  A.  C.  6x9.  27 
pages.  Illustrated.  Paper.  19 14. — Journal  of  the  United 
States  Artillery,  January-February,  191 5. 


Attack  and  Defense  of  Fortified  Harbors. 


This  was  originally  published  as  a  series  of  articles 
in  the  Seattle  Daily  Times.  The  author  was  on  duty  as 
instructor  of  the  Coast  Artillery  Reserve  Corps  of  the 
National  Guard  of  Washington.  He  has  revised  and  re- 
published the  papers  in  a  short  but  interesting  treatise, 
in  pamphlet  form,  for  the  instruction  of  the  officers  of 
that  corps. 

He  has,  very  naturally,  taken  the  defenses  at  the  en- 
trance to  Puget  Sound  and  the  surrounding  country  as  the 
locality  for  illustrating  his  principles,  and  has  used  the 
attack  on  Santiago  in  '1898  and  Farragut's  attack  on  the 
forts  of  Mobile  Bay  as  historical  examples  of  different 
methods  of  attack. 

The  paper  is  of  especial  interest  and  value  in  that  it 
shows  the  fallacy  of  a  purely  naval  attack  on  fortified 
harbors,  and  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  cooperation 
between  land  and  naval  forces  in  a  joint  attack  to  ensure 
victory  and  lasting  results. — J.  W.  W.,  U.  5.  Naval  In- 
stitute Proceedings  y  January -February,  1915. 


82 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  50  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.00  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


APR  14    183^ 


APR 

15 

1934 

DEC 

7 

1942 

JAII12HW76 


r>~^c.iVED 


DEC  3U '66 -5  PM 


LOANPgpT, 


J!iN,211979 


REO. 


^NtliftNtt^L-^3 


JUN  3  0  TO 


U.  C.  BERKELEY 


-^"^^kh  > 


YB  49800 


355534 


HtulcLl. 


,*•■,. 6-  ''•^: 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


